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ABSTRACT 
This thesis identifies and discusses the spread of Islamic extremism as a potential threat 
to the Republic of Macedonia. It examines how Islamic extremism spread within the 
Republic of Macedonia and what policies could reverse this trend. 
The main research findings include the following. Major political, economic, and 
legal changes in Macedonia have provided fertile ground for nontraditional Islamic 
ideologies. Although adherents to radical Islamic ideologies in Macedonia have used 
NGOs and charities as mobilizing structures, they were not able to create their own 
organization. For most Muslims in Macedonia, critiques and visions of contemporary 
radical Islamic ideologues are problematic. Findings also suggest that Muslims in 
Macedonia are most vulnerable to individual recruitment; the attempts of local Islamic 
extremists to mobilize a greater number of followers for collective action were 
unsuccessful. In Macedonia, Islamic extremist ideologies are not a reaction to secularism 
and modernism, nor do they defend religion. Thus, their activities in Macedonia can be 
categorized as forms of potential or marginal fundamentalism. This thesis suggests that 
nurturing a culture of questioning and debating may counter radical Islamic ideologies. 
Other policy recommendations for counterterrorism measures include fighting organized 
crime and application of social network analysis concepts. 
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The purpose of this thesis is to identify and discuss a possible threat to the 
Republic of Macedonia: the spread of Islamic extremism. Specifically, this thesis will 
examine the following: how Islamic extremism has spread within the Republic of 
Macedonia; the significance of this threat; and what policies could reverse this trend. 
Vulnerabilities to extremist ideology within the Republic of Macedonia’s population 
could potentially lead to the creation of terrorist cells and affiliates; understanding how 
this happens is essential to the development of counterterrorist measures. Terrorism is a 
global phenomenon, and therefore addressing the potential terrorist threats in a small 
country such as the Republic of Macedonia can positively impact worldwide security. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The Republic of Macedonia is a small, landlocked, multinational European 
country located in the heart of the Balkans. Macedonia’s population is about 2.2 million, 
and most of its inhabitants are Macedonians. Minorities are represented by Albanians, 
Turks, Rhomas, Serbs, Vlachs, and others. The country’s population is religiously 
divided mainly between Orthodox Christians and Muslims. Macedonians, Serbs, and 
Vlachs are Orthodox Christians. Albanians, Turks, Rhomas, and descendants of 
Macedonians who converted to Islam during the time of Ottoman Empire are Muslims. 
Following the decision to break away from the Yugoslav Federation, the Republic 
of Macedonia became independent in 1991. The country’s short history of independence 
has been complicated. Macedonia was not directly involved and affected by the wars that 
spread in other republics of Yugoslav Federation. However, in 2001, armed conflict 
broke between Albanian minority militant group and security forces. Nowadays the 
country is facing another potential security threat. 
In 2005, at the hearing of the Committee on International Relations House of 
Representatives, Mr. Lorenzo Vidino addressed Islamic extremism in Europe. He 
explained that the terrorist threat in the Balkans is not that big because the numbers of 
individuals carrying activities are few dozen and the Islamist have failed to radicalize 
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Bosnian population. However, Mr. Claude Moniquet expressed his concerns with the 
presence of an ideological center in Macedonia, which seemed to be involved in 
extremist activities. In addition, both of them agreed that if something goes wrong in the 
Balkans in the future it could be a new territory for the jihadists in Europe.1 
In an article published by the Advanced Research and Assessment Group in 2008, 
Kenneth Morrison discusses the issue of Wahhabism in the Balkans which has shifted 
from the margins to the mainstream, becoming key political-security concern; incidents 
involving Wahhabi groups in Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia show the movement is 
no longer isolated within the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina; the proliferation of 
Wahhabism presents a challenge for inter-ethnic and intra-Muslim relations in the 
Balkans.2 
Is the Republic of Macedonia becoming a breeding ground for Islamic extremists? 
The purpose of this thesis is to answer why, how and to what extent Islamic extremism is 
spreading in the Republic of Macedonia. First it will address the phenomena of Islamic 
extremism in general and its spread on a global scale. Second, this thesis will analyze 
specifically the spread and implication of Islamic extremism in the Republic of 
Macedonia. Finally, this thesis will consider and propose actions to reverse the spread of 
Islamic extremism in this country. 
B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The primary purpose of this research is to describe how nontraditional Islamic 
ideologies are spread in the Republic of Macedonia. The thesis will identify which 
foreign Islamic ideologies are present and then it will explore how each one spread in the 
Republic of Macedonia. In addition, the thesis will evaluate to what degree those 
ideologies pose a threat to the country. 
                                                 
1 Lorenzo Vidino and Claude Moniquet, Statement to the House of Representatives, “ Islamic Extremism in 
Europe,” Hearing, April 27, 2005, http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa20917.000/hfa20917_0f.htm 
(accessed October 6, 2011), 44. 
2 Kenneth Morrison. “Wahhabism in the Balkans,” Advanced Research and Assessment Group, Defence 
Academy of the United Kingdom, Shrivenham, England, February 2008, 
http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/arag/document-listings/balkan/08%2806%29KM.pdf/view (accessed October, 21, 
2011). 
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To understand the necessary conditions under which terrorism occurs, theories 
based on sociopolitical grievances are often utilized. These theories essentially state that 
people have grievances and they seek out an ideology to solve their problems. However, 
this theory only addresses the question of why terrorist groups grow or decline in 
response to grievances. 
These arguments do not adequately or specifically explain the surge of Islamic 
terrorism. Particularly, in the case of Macedonia, it is assumed that the grievances of 
minorities were appropriately addressed under the signed Ohrid Framework Agreement 
of 2001. Under this agreement, the Macedonian government pledged to improve the 
rights of the Albanian population, including making Albanian the country’s second 
official language. The agreement also increased the presence of ethnic Albanians in 
government, police and military positions. Most important, under the Ohrid Agreement, 
the Macedonian government agreed to a new model of decentralization. Although these 
changes met grievances from the Albanian population, the traditional form of Islam in the 
country is considered to be moderate when compared to other existing Islamic ideologies. 
Therefore, we need to look beyond grievance-based theories and instead focus how 
ideologies are transmitted and adopted. 
C. IMPORTANCE 
Understanding a country’s present and future security threats are one of the most 
vital questions posed to state officials, the national security community and the general 
public. Most of the time, threats are obvious and easily recognized, but sometimes the 
picture is ambiguous. The spread of Islamic extremism among the Muslim population is 
an increasing worldwide concern. The Republic of Macedonia, being a multinational 
country with Muslim minority, is not immune to this issue. If the Republic of Macedonia 
recognizes the potential threat of Islamic extremism, then the country can react 
appropriately to ensure a secure environment for further development. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are several theories addressing the origins of terrorism. 
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One theory, which is addressed by both Gabriel Sheffer in The Roots of 
Terrorism3 and Mohammed M. Hafez in Why Muslims Rebel,4 attributes the origin of 
terrorism to sociopolitical grievances. According to this theory, the masses can be 
alienated by internal and external factors, and in attempt to solve the issue they often use 
violence. 
In the work Instability and Opportunity: The Origins of Terrorism in Weak and 
Failed States,5 Erica Chenoweth represents a theory of permissive environments. This 
theory explains that weak, ineffective and incapable states deeply affect the origins of 
terrorism. 
According to the Social Movement theory, developed by Doug McAdam, John D. 
McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, the emergence and spread of ideologies in societies are 
explained by political opportunities, mobilizing structures and framing processes.6 
Fundamentalism theory is articulated by Almond, Appleby, and Sivan. According 
to this theory, fundamentalist movements are reactions to secularism, seeking a religious 
alternative.7 
In his book Terror in the Mind of God, Mark Juergensmeyer develops the Cosmic 
War theory. He argues that religious ideologies play significant role in motivating 
violence. According to Juergensmeyer, religious extremist groups perceive secularism as 
insufficient and justify their violence in the idea of cosmic war.8 
                                                 
3 Gabriel Sheffer, “Diasporas and Terrorism,” in The Roots of Terrorism, ed. Louise Richardson, (New York: 
Routledge, 2006), 118–129. 
4 Mohammed M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel (Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publisher, 2003), 27. 
5 Erica Chenoweth, “Instability and Opportunity: The Origins of Terrorism in Weak and Failed States,” in The 
Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes, Volume III: Root Causes, ed. James J. F. Forest 
(London: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006), 17. 
6 Doug McAdam, et al., “Introduction: Opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes-toward a 
synthetic, comparative perspective on social movements,” Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements, Doug 
McAdam et al., New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
7 Gabriel A. Almond, R. Scott Appleby, and Emmanuel Sivan, “Fundamentalisms:  Genus and Species,” Strong 
Religion: The Rise of Fundamentalism Around the World, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003, 90. 
8 Mark Juergensmeyer, “Religion as a Cause of Terrorism,” in the Roots of Terrorism, ed. Louise Richardson 
(New York: Routledge, 2006), 139–141. 
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E. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This thesis is a single, descriptive case study of the Republic of Macedonia. The 
research will focus on developments and conditions in the country since gaining its 
independence in 1991. The country’s history leading up current events is recounted. 
These events are then explained and evaluated. Since the aim of this research is to explain 
and evaluate the phenomenon of Islamic extremism in the country, and others have not 
fully described this problem, the research will be descriptively rich. In addition, the 
research will take into account the historical developments of various Islamic 
movements, groups, networks and organizations around the world. The conclusion of this 
thesis draws inductive conclusions from the case study. This thesis will not create or test 
a new theory, but rather will describe the presence of Islamic extremism in Macedonia. 
Due to the nature of the topic and the scope of the research, the thesis utilizes a 
wide spectrum of existing information related to Islamic extremism. Sources of literature 
include books, journals, and academic articles. Local newspapers, televised news 
programs, and the online sources will also be utilized and analyzed; these sources are 
necessary for a complete understanding of the situation in the country. The aspect of 
cautions, sensitive and impartial approach in gathering information is acknowledged. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Chapter I provides a brief historical background of the Republic of Macedonia 
and explains that the presence of Islamic extremism is a security threat in the country. 
This chapter introduces several theories regarding terrorism, the rise of religious 
violence, and the emergence of extremist movements. The purpose, scope and research 
question of this thesis is outlined, as well as the methodology, resources, and the 
significance of this research. 
Chapter II further details regarding terrorism motivated by religious and social 
dynamics of extremist movements. First, the social movement theory is used to analyze 
the individual recruitment, emergence of the extremist movements and the spread of 
movements. Later this analysis is applied to the case of Islamic extremism in the 
Republic of Macedonia and serves as tool in defining the threat they posed to the country. 
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Second, this chapter explains “fundamentalism theory” and applies it as an analytical tool 
for explaining the ideological and organizational characteristics of Islamic extremist in 
Macedonia. 
Chapter III provides a working definition of ideology and explores Islamic 
extremist ideologies. First, the chapter defines ideology as set of ideas related to 
explanation of problems in the world, identification of who is responsible for the 
problems, and vision how to fix the problems. Next, it lists common characteristics of 
extremist ideologies irrespective to their doctrinal beliefs. This chapter identifies 
Islamism, Wahhabism, and Salafism, and shows how they are connected to Islamic 
extremist ideologies, which are radically anti-secular and anti-western. Wahhabism is one 
of the most ultraconservative forms of Islam that wives the world in sharp divisions 
between Muslims and non-Muslim, belief and unbelief, and the realm of Islam and 
warfare. Salafism advocates that Muslims have to return to bases of pure Islam and 
understand and practice the faith as it was by the prophet and his followers. Finally, the 
chapter provides comparative analysis of these three Islamic extremist ideologies. 
Chapter IV discusses in more detail the spread of Islamic extremist ideologies 
among Muslim population in Macedonia. Radical Islamic ideologies were not present in 
the country until early 1990s. Their infiltration started with exploitation of internal 
divisions within Islamic Community in Macedonia. Next, the presence of Islamic foreign 
fighters in local conflicts in the Balkans and nongovernmental and humanitarian 
organizations played important role in promotion of Islamic extremist ideologies among 
local Muslim population. Finally, this chapter explores the presence of Islamic extremist 
ideologies among ethnically different and distinct Muslim groups in Macedonia. 
The thesis concludes with Chapter V, which argues that Islamic extremists have 
found mainly nominal support among the Muslim population in Macedonia, whose 
majority follows the traditional form of Islam. However, small radical groups do pose a 
security threat for Macedonia; foreign support and funding enable the spread and 
persistence of Islamic extremist ideologies in the country. This chapter concludes with 
several policy recommendations for dealing with the threat of Islamic extremism. 
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II. RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Theories related to the rise of religious violence were developed in the 20th 
century. The purpose of this chapter is to describe the causal arguments of these theories 
and analyze the permissiveness of Macedonia to the spread of Islamic extremism. First, 
this chapter will discuss some of the theories developed to explain religiously motivated 
violence in general, and then apply their causal arguments to explain the spread of 
Islamic extremist ideologies in Macedonia. 
B. SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 
Social Movement theory has been primarily developed by McAdam, McCarthy, 
and Zald. Drawing from theoretical and empirical work of various scientists in relation to 
the emergence and development of social movements, these authors find three broad sets 
of factors: the political opportunities and constraints confronting the movement, the 
forms of organization available to insurgents, and the collective process of interpretation, 
attribution, and social construction that mediate between opportunity and action. Authors 
refer to these factors with shorthand designations of political opportunities, mobilizing 
structures, and framing processes.9 
Under political opportunities the authors are convinced that social movements are 
shaped by broader set of political constraints and opportunities unique to the national 
context in which they are embedded. This means that, in analyzing the threat of the 
spread of Islamic extremism in Macedonia, the country’s political system needs to be 
taken in account. 
By mobilizing structures authors mean of collective vehicles, informal as well as 
formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action. This means that 
in the analysis of the spread of Islamic extremism in Macedonia, in search for mobilizing 
                                                 
9 Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, “Introduction: Opportunities, mobilizing structures, and 
framing processes--toward a synthetic, comparative perspective on social movements,” Comparative Perspectives on 
Social Movements (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 2. 
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structures we need to look for formal organizational manifestations of the mobilization 
processes, and for various informal grassroots settings. Particularly, attention should be 
given to the role played by local Muslim institutions as the Islamic Religious Community 
(Islamska Verska Zaednica, IVZ), universities, NGOs, charities, clubs, forum, libraries, 
etc. 
Authors define framing processes as “conscious strategic efforts by groups of 
people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate 
and motivate collective action.”10 This means that a combination of political 
opportunities and mobilizing structures can provide potential for action but in absence of 
framing processes social movements will be insufficient for collective action. In other 
words, framing processes are used by the people who feel aggravated about some aspect 
of their lives, and believe that by acting collectively they can redress the problem. In 
analyzing the spread of Islamic extremism in Macedonia, perceptions held by local 
Muslims will be taken into account. 
The influence of religion upon social movements is analyzed by Christian Smith 
in his work “Disruptive Religion.” The author argues that religion has been neglected in 
the studies of social movements. According to Smith, religious believers and 
organizations possess a variety of assets that are useful for promoting social movements. 
In addition, the sacred transcendence of religions has the dual potential to both challenge 
as well as legitimize a social order. According to Smith, “All actors and sectors of a 
society in which religion is operative may potentially be evaluated and condemned by the 
sacredly-grounded normative standards of that religion.”11 
Analyzing the social movements and networks, Mario Diani and Doug McAdam 
go beyond structural analysis to explain the dynamics of social movements. First, the 
authors acknowledge the importance of structural studies in overturning the failed 
psychological concept of social movements. 
                                                 
10 McAdam, et al., “Introduction: Opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes--toward a 
synthetic, comparative perspective on social movements,” 6. 
11 Christian Smith, “Introduction: Correcting a Curious Neglect, or Bringing Religion Back In,” Disruptive 
Religion: The force of Faith in Social Movement Action, New York: Routledge, 1996, 7. 
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According to McAdam, “social movements are loosely coordinated, sustained 
struggles to promote or resist change that rely at least in part on unconventional tactics, 
and unconventional forms of collective action,”12 and understanding how movements 
first develop and spread is very important, particularly in the case of Islamic 
fundamentalism, because this phenomena continues to happen. First, the author argues 
that psychological perspective on social movements developed until 1970s is untenable 
and the structural research of social movements with the establishment of consistent 
empirical relationships in the origins and spread of social movements is not sufficient. 
McAdam argues that in order to better understand the origins and spread of social 
movements, analysts should go beyond the structural analysis and identify the underlying 
dynamic social processes between structure and action. 
The dynamic between structure and action deals with individual recruitment. 
Contrary to traditional beliefs that marginalized, isolated individuals are the cause of 
social movements, McAdam finds that the integrated members of a community are most 
at risk to be drawn into the struggle. Individuals tend to be recruited through pre-existing 
ties to somebody already in a movement. In addition, the author argues that the likelihood 
of successful recruitment is dramatically increased when three mechanisms accumulate 
sequentially. The individual is a target of a recruitment effort; the recruitment effort 
involves an activity questioning the identity of the individual being recruited (“as a good 
Muslim you must…”); finally, the individual must meet support or opposition from the 
important members of the movement and community.13 
Social movements almost always develop within established social settings, 
existing organizations, and stable networks. However, existing organizations do not 
routinely birth social movements. Rather, they typically constrain radical actions. 
According to McAdam, it is necessary to find the specific part of existing 
organizations that became the source of initial mobilization, and discover the social 
                                                 
12 Doug McAdam, Social Movements and Conflict, presented at Understanding Terrorist Networks and 
Organizations, NPS, April 5–7, 2005, 1. 
13 Doug McAdam and Mario Diani, Social movements and Networks, Beyond Structural Analysis: Toward a 
More Dynamic Understanding of Social Movements, Oxford University Press, 288. 
 10 
processes that transform them into these types of sources. The goal of this method termed 
“Social Appropriations” is to show how routine collective identities, cultural and 
organizational practices are appropriated in the service of the new line of action. When 
this perspective is applied to the case of Islamic fundamentalism, particular mosques, 
Quran study groups and particular cleric networks serve as basic vehicles for the 
emergent actions of radical Islam. In addition, networks forged within localized struggles, 
during previous jihad campaigns, bring people from different parts of the world together, 
and thus diffuse networks with the capability to spread their activities beyond a single 
campaign. It is not sufficient to identify what structures look like; the ideology, that 
activates the structure, must also be identified.14 
Another dynamic thatMcAdam discusses is the process by which social 
movements spread. McAdam argues that if social movements spread only along 
established lines of inter-action and communication (relational diffusion), they would 
remain mostly localized. Social movements spread in two ways: non-relational diffusion 
and brokerage. Non-relational diffusion is the spread of social movements through 
means, other than established lines, such as media. Brokerage is the spread of social 
movements through pro-active efforts of outside groups and individuals.15 McAdam 
concludes that “the ideal structure for insuring the maximum spread of a movement is 
dense networks of local primary ties, deep networks of trust, private networks that are 
then linked together through an extensive set of weak bridging ties, provided in most 
cases by brokers.”16 
Social movement theory implies that some of the Muslim population in 
Macedonia might adopt nontraditional, radical Islamic ideologies due to changes of the 
political system, and mobilize and engage in collective action through existing networks. 
                                                 
14 McAdam and Diani, Social movements and Networks, 291. 
15 McAdam and Diani, Social movements and Networks, 294. 
16 McAdam, “Social Movements and Conflict,” 10. 
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1. Political Opportunities 
The political system in Republic of Macedonia is essentially a parliamentary 
representative democratic republic. It provides opportunities for participation in the 
political life to everyone who accepts democratic values. Muslims in Macedonia, 
represented by various political parties, have always been part of the political affairs in 
the country. 
Despite the rights guaranteed by the constitution, tensions among ethnic minority 
groups are present in Macedonian society. Causes for such tensions can be identified in 
the inherited mistrust and prejudices among ethnic groups. Tensions often arise between 
the majority and minority, but also between two or more minority groups. Moreover, the 
disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation in early 1990s, the fall of socialism as a 
political system, and most importantly the spread of wars and conflicts in Bosnia, 
Kosovo, and Macedonia represent tectonic political, legal, and economic changes in the 
region. These conditions were exploited by various challengers, such as the vanguard 
Islamic extremists who promoted their extremist ideologies. 
2. Mobilizing Structures 
The religious life of most Muslims in Macedonia has always been the 
responsibility of an officially recognized, and well established, Islamic religious 
community. Promoters of radical Islamic ideologies, seeking mobilized structures, are 
using these established lines of communication for their purposes. These activities are 
most visible as “mosque wars” and “top down” approaches struggles for the control of 
religion, and property owned by IVZ. In addition, numerous non-government 
organizations and charities often serve as established structures for the development of 
Islamic extremist ideologies. However, adherents to radical Islamic ideologies in 
Macedonia have not been able to create their own organizational structure and thus 
depend on the support of external factors. 
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3. Framing Processes 
Framing processes have been among the most challenging obstacles for adherents 
of Islamic extremist ideologies in Macedonia. Rather than ideological innovators, they 
have been followers and promoters of Sunni Islamic radical ideology and concepts 
developed by Ibn Taymiyah, Hassan al Banna, Sayyid Abdul a’la Mawdudi, and 
contemporary ideologues Sayyid Qutb and members of al-Qaeda. In addition, the 
acceptance of their critiques of the existing order, visions and means for achieving better 
future, for most Muslims in Macedonia seems to be problematic. Framing processes of 
local adherents of radical Islamic ideology, playing the role of promoters, will never be 
their exclusive property. 
4. Individual Recruitment 
Social movement theory explains that individual recruitment is the first dynamic 
process between the structure and actions of Islamic extremists. Local Muslims in 
Macedonia have had many opportunities to meet and build close relationships with 
affiliates of terrorist organizations. Some of them fought together in local wars and 
conflicts, while others were sent abroad in Arab countries as students of Islam. Local 
Muslims in Macedonia are very vulnerable because it would be relatively easy to be 
persuaded that, as good Muslims whose identities are questioned, they have to join the 
“struggle” and adopt more radical ideologies. Positive or negative influence from others 
is probably the most critical mechanism in the individual recruitment of local Muslims. In 
Macedonia the relative absence of negative influence attempts was the biggest challenge. 
Muslim families in Macedonia are socially very conservative and family members are 
rarely aloud to express their own opinions. Until recently, even the representatives of IVZ 
were hesitant to confront the existence of groups affiliated with radical Islamic 
ideologies. In addition, members of families send to work as laborers have had numerous 
opportunities to meet Islamic extremist in Western European countries. 
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5. Emergent Mobilization 
Local Wahhabi adherents in Macedonia have used well established Islamic 
organization, such as IVZ to promote their ideology and propagate collective action. This 
was also case with several charitable and nongovernmental organizations. 
However, existing organizations in Macedonia constrain radical actions. After 
several violent incidents, Official representatives of IVZ decided to openly confront 
Wahhabi adherents. As a consequence, Wahhabi adherents were unable to transform 
several mosques into centers for their activities. Although informal networks and 
personal contacts among local Wahhabi groups certainly exist, they will not be able to 
attract and mobilize greater number of followers as long as they do not establish their 
own organization. Thus, it is more likely that efforts of local Wahhabis to attract new 
members remain only in the realm of individual recruitment. 
6. Movement Spread 
The spread of Wahhabi ideology in Macedonia would remain localized if 
communication occurred only along established lines of communication, through 
relational diffusion. This is the case because local Wahhabi adherents, mainly ethnic 
Albanians, are willing to appropriate the assets of official organization of IVZ. They have 
successfully spread their activities only in several mosques in Skopje. 
However, in order to spread their ideology, local Wahhabi adherents now 
communicate through the Internet and other, non-established forms of communication. 
The Internet and media in Macedonia are used to promote anti-Western attitude and 
fundamentalist Islamic teachings. Brokerage is also present in Macedonia. This is most 
obvious in the activities of Tablighi Jamma’at, primarily present in areas inhabited by 
Macedonian Muslims. In the past, these areas were relatively disconnected from 
happenings in the Muslim world. 
Active involvement of Tablighi Jamma’at has considerably changed the situation 
in these areas. Even though both processes of relational diffusion and brokerage are 
obviously present in Macedonia, local Wahhabi adherents have not been able to attain the 
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collective action of Muslim population. Rather, their activities have led to increased 
tensions between Muslims in different ethnic and language groups. 
C. FUNDAMENTALISM THEORY 
Gabriel A. Almond, R. Scott Appleby, and Emmanuel Sivan define 
fundamentalism as movements that “originate in reaction to secularization and the 
marginalization of religion, and they strive to create a religious alternative to secular 
structures and institutions.”17 Their work describes five ideological and four 
organizational characteristics. To be considered fundamentalist, a movement must react 
and defend the religious contend from erosion. Only after this necessary ideological 
characteristic—reaction to the marginalization of religion—is present in the movement, 
can the additional characteristics be classified as defining, since it must manifest a 
sufficient number of these characteristics. 
By close examination of case studies, the authors name three types of religious 
extremism: Abrahamic, syncretic, and potential fundamentalism. Abrahamic 
fundamentalism is associated with Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. These religions share 
similar religious traditions and a common heritage; they resemble each other 
ideologically and organizationally. When movements are inspired less by religious 
considerations than by actual fundamentalism, and ethocultural and ethnonational 
features take precedence over religion, they are categorized as “syncretic fundamental.” 
Some revivalist movements have superficial resemblances to fundamentalism, and 
because they do not react against secularism and modernism, they are categorized as 
potential-marginal fundamentalism.18 
1. Ideological Characteristics 
Fundamentalism theory implies that Islamic religious movements in Macedonia 
would be considered as fundamentalist, first and foremost, if they were reaction to the 
secularization and marginalization of their religion. In regard to this ideological 
                                                 
17 Gabriel A. Almond, R. Scott Appleby, and Emmanuel Sivan, “Fundamentalisms: Genus and Species,” Strong 
Religion: The Rise of Fundamentalism around the World, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003, 90. 
18 Almond, Appleby, and Sivan, “Fundamentalisms: Genus and Species,” 105–114. 
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characteristic, the situation in Macedonia is very ambiguous. Most critiques come from 
senior representatives of IVZ. On several occasions they have blamed the government of 
Macedonia for neglecting the religion of Islam and for unequal treatment compared to 
other religions. 
However, it is inappropriate to categorize these critiques as reaction to secularism. 
IVZ is interested in as appearing to be a politically active and relevant institution seeking 
to obtain assets in the process of restitution. On the other hand, Wahhabi groups in 
Macedonia operate in secretly, but publicly glorify the values of democratic societies. 
They often maintain close links with members of political parties. In both cases, it is 
more likely that critiques are aimed at ethno-cultural and property issues, rather than 
being reactive towards secularism and modernism, even less defending religion. 
a. Selectivity 
Selectivity is a characteristic of fundamentalism manifested by modernity 
and the selection of traditional aspects that clearly distinguish fundamentalism from the 
mainstream.19 In Macedonia, Muslim adherents of Islamic extremist ideology certainly 
distinguish themselves from the mainstream Muslim community. Being followers of 
Wahhabism and Salafism they advocate strict adherence to the oneness of God and reject 
interpretations of the scripture. However, local Wahhabists and Salafists in Macedonia 
are not jihadis, but rather what Wiktorowicz20 calls “politicos” or “purists.” The 
selectivity of Wahhabis in Macedonia is most visibly demonstrated by their violent acts 
towards other Muslims. In addition, the aspect of modernity is clearly present among 
local adherents of Wahhabism. They utilize technological innovations such as the 
Internet, computer technologies and media in order to spread radical Islamic ideology. 
 
                                                 
19 Almond, Appleby, and Sivan, “Fundamentalisms: Genus and Species,” 95. 
20 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29 (2006): 207–
239.  
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b. Moral Manichaeanism 
A dualistic worldview among Wahhabis in Macedonia is present to a low 
degree. It is characterized by division of the good and evil, darkness and light, a 
contaminated world and a pure world.21 For Wahhabis, the sinful world is composed, 
first and foremost, by Sufi believers, and then by the representatives of traditional Islam. 
In addition, they have hesitated to publicly present the West as contaminated. 
c. Absolutism and Inerrancy 
Absolutism and inerrancy as ideological characteristic of fundamentalist 
movements represent the divine origin and true and accurate sources of religion. At the 
same time other analog religious sources are treated as wrong, and the inerrancy can vary 
in different degrees.22 
Adherents to Wahhabi ideology in Macedonia have manifested low 
absolutism and inerrancy. They consider The Qu’ran (recitations) to be the only accurate 
religious source, but they have not been able to develop new and original interpretations 
of the holy book. They have never been ideological innovators and Hanafi school of 
Islamic law prevails among Muslims in Macedonia. 
d. Millennialism and Messianism 
Millennialism and messianism, which concerns the Day of Judgment, the 
triumph over evil, and the arrival of savior, is in all Abrahamic religions. Islamic 
fundamentalists explore these characteristics in their interpretations.23 However, this 
ideological characteristic has been manifested to a low degree among Wahhabi adherents 
in Macedonia. They have not been able to stage these issues more than they are in 
traditional Islam. 
 
                                                 
21 Almond et al., “Fundamentalisms: Genus and Species,” 96. 
22 Almond et al., “Fundamentalisms: Genus and Species,” 96. 
23 Almond et al., “Fundamentalisms: Genus and Species,” 97. 
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2. Organizational Characteristics 
a. Elect Membership 
Distinctions between the elected, chosen, faithful inner group and a 
periphery of sympathizers are present among Islamic extremists in Macedonia. Although 
able to achieve some level of solidarity and cohesion, Wahhabi adherents in Macedonia 
are mainly interested in material rewords. 
b. Sharp Boundaries 
There is a physical and visual separation between the saved and the sinful. 
In general, dividing walls and a distinctive dress code clearly illustrate the boundaries 
within Islamic fundamentalists. Traditionally in Macedonia, Muslim women wear scarf 
that covers the hair. Although men and women in Macedonia have recently begun 
wearing long beards and wearing niqab, they do so because they receive money and not 
to separate themselves from others according to their religious believes. 
c. Authoritarian Organization 
The presence of a leader-follower relationship illustrated in body language 
and rituals represent the organizational characteristic of authoritarian organization. This 
organizational characteristic in the case of Macedonia is present to a low degree. 
Certainly there are individuals willing to act as leaders but characteristic also indicates 
the decline in the interest of joining the movement and mobilization problems. These 
individuals have not been elected or chosen but rather represent self-proclaimed leaders. 
d. Behavior Requirements 
Behavior requirements as organizational characteristics of fundamentalist 
movements show the presence of detailed prescriptions of proper dress code and 
appearance on one hand and on another hand the roles of sinful behavior related to 
drinking, sexuality and appropriate speech. Similar to other organizational characteristics 
of fundamentalism movements, in general, this characteristic is considered to be highly 
present in the case of Islamic fundamentalists. However, in Macedonia, it appears that 
traditional Islamic behavior and appearance of Muslims prevails and this characteristic is 
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present to a low degree. In particular, it seems that young and educated Muslims in 
Macedonia prefer to follow western-style fashion trends and do not pay big attention in 
regard to the sinful behavior prescribed by their religion. 
D. “COSMIC WAR” THEORY 
Mark Juergensmeyer argues that religious ideas have an important role in 
religiously motivated violence. Juergensmeyer discusses the common ideological 
components of religious extremist groups. Particularly, he explores perceived oppression 
of secular state perceived by these groups, who he believes, justify violence with “cosmic 
war.”24 
Cosmic war is “dichotomous opposition on absolute scale:”25 the perceived 
enemy has to be completely destroyed, and the struggle must be uncompromising. “The 
very existence of the opponent is a threat, and until the enemy is either crushed or 
contained, one’s own existence cannot be secure.”26 Religious struggles have 
Manichaean characteristic by dividing the world into fight between good and evil. 
According to Juergensmeyer there are two not contradictory approaches to 
explaining religious violence. The first approach concerns the extreme characteristics of 
religion that lead to violence; the second concerns real-life violent conflicts which 
attempt to be validated religiously. 
When addressing conditions connect the cosmic war with actual acts of violence, 
Juergensmeyer explains “the cosmic struggle is understood to be occurring in this world 
rather than in a mythical setting; believers identify personally with the struggle; and the 
struggle is at a point of crisis in which individual actions can make all the difference.”27 
There are three conditions for confrontations to be characterized as cosmic war: the 
                                                 
24 Mark Juergensmeyer, “Religion as a Cause of Terrorism,” in the Roots of Terrorism, ed. Louse Richardson 
(New York: Routledge, 2006), 139–141. 
25 Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley: University 
of California Press 2003), 152. 
26 Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, 152. 
27 Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, 164. 
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struggle is perceived as a defense of basic identity and dignity, losing the struggle would 
be unthinkable, and the struggle cannot be won in real time or in real terms.28 
If the struggle is seen as a cultural war with spiritual implications, personal 
humiliations often lead to attempts to recover personal dignity and cultural pride. The 
struggle may be taken beyond human conception and viewed on transhistorical plane. If 
goals are unachievable, they will be defined as fulfillment of holy order. In hopeless 
moments, “sacred strength” is the only resource available; grand scenarios of cosmic war 
are needed. 
In these cases the use of violence is legitimized and minor skirmishes are elevated 
to colossal proportions.29 
Cosmic war theory is not applicable in the case of Macedonia. Tensions among 
ethnic groups in the country exist, but they have not been in defense of entire cultures. 
Furthermore, the scale of violent incidents in Macedonia is very small and does not 
represent the “sacred struggle” of Muslims in the country. Finally, the situation in the 
country is not perceived to be hopeless and the perception of oppression is absent. 
                                                 
28 Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, 165. 
29 Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, 165. 
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This chapter is a search for the most appropriate definition of ideology. Because 
the phenomenon of international terrorism is a functional issue,30 this research draws on 
literature related to the functional aspects of ideology as a set of ideas that mobilize and 
shape human behavior. According to Iain MacKenzie, ideologies are powerful because 
they combine critiques of an existing order and a vision for a better system: “Along with 
a map of reality comes a picture of an ideal society. An Ideology, then, provides both an 
account of existing social and political relations and a blueprint of how these relations 
ought to be organized.”31 
Andrew Heywood argues that ideologies are important because they combine 
together the worlds of action and thought. He defines ideology as: 
A more or less coherent set of ideas that provides the basis for organized 
political action, weather this is intended to preserve, modify or overthrow 
the existing system of power. All ideologies therefore, have following 
features: 
• They offer an account of existing order, usually in the form of a “world 
view.” 
• They advance a model of a desired future, a vision of the “good society.” 
• They explain how political change can and should be broth about—how to 
get from (a) to (b).”32 
In short, ideologies tend to explain what is wrong in the world and identify where 
the responsibility for the existing problems lies. Finally, they are a call to action. 
                                                 
30 David Tucker, Skirmishes at the Edge of Empire: The United States and International Terrorism  (Westport, 
CT, Praeger Publishers: 1997) 110. 
31 Iain MacKenzie, “The Arena of Ideology,” in Robert Eccleshall, Vincent Georghegan, Richard Jay, Michael 
Kenny, Iain MacKenzie, and Rick Wilford, eds., Political Ideologies: An Introduction, Second Edition (London and 
New York: Routledge, 1998), 1. 
32 Heywood, Political ideologies: An Introduction, 12. 
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B. EXTREMIST IDEOLOGIES 
Irrespective of their specific doctrinal beliefs, extremist ideologies are recognized 
by certain common characteristics. According to scholars, extremism is distinct 
phenomenon characterized by manicheanism, monism, authoritarianism or 
totalitarianism, collectivism, utopianism, hyper-moralism and/or puritanism, conspiracy 
mongering, and a penchant for demonizing and dehumanizing designated enemies.33 
• Manichenianism is the dualistic concept of good and evil, which 
encourages a sharp division of the world into good and evil. 
• Monism is the opposite of pluralism. For extremists, different views are 
unacceptable. 
• Hyper-moralism justifies violence with the intention of creating a better 
world. 
• Utopian agendas cannot be obtained in the real world. Extremists become 
frustrated and attempt to eliminate everybody who stands in their way; 
obsession eclipses reality. 
• Collectivist ideologies do not recognize individual rights. 
• Authoritarian and totalitarian groups control the behavior of their 
adherents by attempting to influence the way their adherents think. 
• Extremists dehumanize and demonize their enemies. 
• Extremist ideologies promote paranoia: the view that the enemy is 
everywhere. Violence is justified with the need to stop and destroy the 
enemy. This characteristic also explains the tendency of conspiratorial 
thinking. 
                                                 
33 John George and Laird Wilcox, American Extremists: Militias, Supremacists, Klansmen, Communists, and 
Others, Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1996, 54–62; Gian Mario Bravo, L’estremismo in Italia, Rome: Riuniti, 
1982, 7–18; and Neil J. Smelser, the Faces of Terrorism: Social and Psychological Dimensions, Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2007, 58–80. 
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C. ISLAMIC EXTREMIST IDEOLOGIES  
1. Islamism 
Jeffrey M. Bale defines Islamism as “A radically anti secular and anti-western 
Political current of contemporary Islamic thought with both revolutionary and revivalist 
characteristics.”34 He explains that principal characteristics of Islamism: rejection of 
Western secular values, resistance to all forms of “infidel” influence over the Muslim 
world, hostility towards less committed and militant Muslims (takfir), and an insistence 
establishing an Islamic order governed by a rigid application of the shari’a. 
Bale details several misconceptions regarding Islamism.  One misconception is 
the conflation of Islam, one of the world’s most common religions, with Islamism, a 
radical modern Islamic political ideology. The existing allegation is that negative 
characteristics of Islamism are intrinsic to Islam itself. Bale argues that although it is true 
that Islamism and its jihadist variant derive from specific interpretations of Islam, these 
particular interpretations are not the only possible, much less the most authentic or widely 
shared.35 
Another misconception is the tendency to cover up Islam and apologize for 
Islamism on assertions that Islam is a “religion of peace,” or in other words that Islamism 
has nothing to do with Islam. Bale refutes these claims: Islam is a missionary 
monotheistic religion and, due to its pattern of historical growth, has been more prone to 
adopt hostile and belligerent attitudes towards non-believers. He claims that Islamism is 
inconceivable without reference to Islam because it is a radical ideology explicitly based 
on a strict and puritanical interpretation of Islamic doctrine.36 
 
 
                                                 
34 Jeffrey M. Bale, “Islamism,” in Encyclopedia of Bioterrorism Defense, ed. Richard F. Pilch and Raymond A 
Zilinskas (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley and Sons, 2005), 296. 
35 Bale, “Islamism and Totalitarianism,” 74. 
36 Bale, “Islamism and Totalitarianism,” 75–77. 
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Another misconception is that there are moderate and radical forms of Islamism, 
that Islamism is essentially a new type of “democratic movement from below,” Islamism 
can be seen as an Islamic form of “liberation theology,” and that “Islamic threat” does not 
really exists or it has been exaggerated. 
Bale argues that even Islamists who reject violence as tactic of achieving their 
goals do not have moderate goals. Islamist opposition towards authoritarian regimes 
occurs primarily because those states are considered “apostate” or “un-Islamic.” 
Historical records show that no Islamist movement has ever “liberated” anyone. Jihadist 
terrorist attacks have afflicted many countries in the world, and escalation is ongoing.37 
According to Bale, Islamism has often been falsely equated with Muslim 
fundamentalism, Muslim traditionalism, and political Islam.38 
Fundamentalism is best explained as an attempt by religious movements to return 
to uncorrupted fundamental elements of their own religious traditions. In the Islamic 
context, this generally means a strict adherence to Qur’anic injunction and the example 
set by the Prophet Muhammad. However, in different geographical and historical areas 
there are different forms of fundamentalism without any political agenda. Thus Islamism 
can be categorized as one particular subset of activist Islamic fundamentalism. 
Islamism should not be confused with Muslim traditionalism. Many Muslim 
scholars, who define themselves as traditionalists, consider Islamism to be prone to 
violent sectarian movements that produces disunity (fitna) within the Muslim community 
(umma). Moreover, despite the demands of a restoration of Islamic faith, Islamism is a 
relatively recent political variant of Islamic thought, and should not be confused with 
earlier Islamic reform movements. 
Islamism does not refer to all types of political movements in the Muslim world. 
Political Islam includes all doctrines which aim to politicize Islam, or vice versa. 
Islamism is only one of many doctrinal currents that fall under a broader category, along 
                                                 
37 Bale, “Islamism and Totalitarianism,” 77–79. 
38 Bale, “Islamism,” 296. 
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with Moderate Reformist Islam and Liberal Islam. In fact, within the political Islam 
spectrum, Islamism occupies a position near the far right end. 
Moreover, there are several distinct ideological currents within Islamism. Hassan 
al-Banna, the founder of Muslim Brotherhood, argued that Egyptian and Muslim society 
in general was in state of crisis because it adopted Western secular ideologies and did not 
follow the right path of the faith. His revival began as a critique of Muslim leadership 
which failed to lead the community towards its true faith and identity: Islam.39 Banna’s 
organization infiltrated the state apparatus, engaged it in proselytizing, and provided 
social services in order to limit the exposure of masses to secular Western values.40 
The South Asian Islamic ideologue Sayyid Abu al-A’la Mawdudi argued that 
Western culture and ideas were corrupt. He reinterpreted the term jahiliyyah to describe 
the ignorance of the world before the revelation of the Qur’an.41 Although he portrayed 
his movement as a revolutionary party, he was more concerned with the nature of the 
future Islamic state rather than the methods of seizing power.42 
The Egyptian Sayyid Qutb blamed the decline of Islam on Muslim leadership, 
which he accused of bending to the will of political authorities and compromising the 
teaching of Islam. He named governments that embrace secularism as jahilil because the 
right to govern over other humans was reserved for God, not for humans.43 According to 
Qutb, because modern Muslim societies were corrupt and spiritually bankrupt, they had 
to be destroyed and replaced by a true Islamic state and society.44 
                                                 
39 John L. Esposito, Islamic Threat: Myth of reality? (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 121; Brynjar 
Lia, The Society of Muslim Brothers in Egypt (Ithaca, NY: IthacaPress, 1998) 55–60. 
40 Bale, “Islamism,” 297. 
41 Charles J. Adams, “Mawdudi and the Islamic State,” in Voices of Resurgent Islam, ed. John L. Esposito (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 101. 
42 Bale, “Islamism,” 297. 
43 William E. Shepard, “Sayyid Qutb’s Doctrine of Jahiliyya,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 35 
(2003): 526–528.  
44 Bale, “Islamism,” 297. 
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Even more radical was the Egyptian Muhammad’ Abd al-Salam al-Faraj, who 
insisted that armed jihad is the sixth pillar of Islam. He introduced the process of takfir by 
which less militarized Muslims are marked as targets for violence. 
Finally, Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri further transformed Islamic strategy 
by insisting that the target of their jihad should be the United States rather than corrupt 
Muslim governments.45 
2. Wahhabism 
Wahhabi Islam, the official form of Islam in Saudi Arabia, is one of the most 
ultraconservative forms of Islam. Its name originates from Muhammad Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab (1703–1791), a scholar of Islamic law and theology. Disappointed by the decline 
and moral negligence of his society, he denounced many popular beliefs and practices as 
un-Islamic idolatry. He rejected the imitations of past scholarships and regarded the 
medieval law of religious scholars (ulama) as imperfect and unsound. Abd al-Wahhab 
called for an interpretation of Islam that will return to the “fundamentals” of Islam found 
in the Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad. 
A religious-political movement was formed when Abd al-Wahhab joined with 
Muhammad Ibn Saud. As a local tribal chief, Ibn Saud used Wahhabism in order to 
legitimize his jihad for subduing and uniting the tribes of Arabia, which were converted 
to the puritanical version of Islam. Wahhabi’s extreme theology saw the world in sharp 
divisions: Muslims and non-Muslim, believers and non-believers, Islam and warfare. 
Thus, all Muslims who did not agree with his theology were regarded as unbelievers and 
were fought and killed in the name of Islam. God’s unity (tawhid) was central to their 
theology, and they self-designated themselves as “Unitarians” (muwahiddun). 
By the early twentieth century, Abdulaziz Ibn Saud united the tribes of Arabia, 
recaptured Riyadh from Muhammad Ali of Egypt, restored the Saudi kingdom, and 
spread Wahhabism. Using the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam as the official basis for 
state and society, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia declared itself as an Islamic state by 
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melding political and religious settings. The Saudis exported their ultraconservative 
version of Wahhabi Islam to the Muslim communities and other countries by aiding 
development, commissioning imams and religious scholars, funding and distributing 
religious tracts, and building mosques, libraries, and other institutions. Some the wealth 
from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf also provided financial support to extremist groups who 
followed the militant brand of Islam.46 
According to Schwartz, Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of 
Wahhabism, found his main inspiration in Ibn Taymiyyah. In the 13th century, the 
Mongol’s conquest of Arab dominions, especially Baghdad, was perceived by its 
inhabitants as a sign of the “end time.” It was Ibn Taymiyyah, a Hanbali scholar, who 
rebelled against the Islamized Mongol rulers. He argued that the political state and the 
religious scholars need to function as a single entity, and that Muslims who did not live 
under Shariah are the worst of all evils. He declared total war on Sufusm and Shi’ism. By 
encouraging jihad as a mean of dividing Muslims he returned to the mentality of the 
Khawarij.47 
Fundamentalists in Islam are known as the Khawarij: members who emerged 
from the ranks of Ali’s supporters during his conflict with Umayyad. Since the followers 
of Ali desired an egalitarian Islam inclusive of differences, the Khawarij aimed at 
dictatorship. Thus, Kawarij presaged the Wahhabi phenomenon that emerged in the 18th 
century and gained huge influence over the ummah, owing to the emergence of the Saudi 
state and the discovery of oil in the Arabian Peninsula.48 
In his early adulthood, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab traveled all around the Ottoman 
Empire. One of his later goals was to liquidate it. Similarly like Taymiyyah, al-Wahhab 
perceived that the Muslim caliphate was in crisis; and particularly, the defeat at the Battle 
of Vienna was viewed as the “end time.” Wahhab’s preached that the ritual is superior to 
intent, that reverence for the dead is not permitted, and that when addressing God there 
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can be no intercessory prayer by means of Prophet or saints. He condemned unbelievers, 
those who did not participate in all prayers; he ordered that mosques should be free of all 
decorations; he demanded that Muslims should not shave or trim their beards; and he 
hated celebrations of the Prophet’s birthday. In addition, al-Wahhab in his call for 
“reform,” ordered that graves of Muslim saints be dug up and scattered, despised music 
as a sin, and burned many books believing that the Quran is sufficient for human needs. 
It should be noted that in efforts to stop the Wahhabi’s bloodshed in Arabia, the 
Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II appointed Muhammad Ali Pasha as governor of Egypt. Ali 
Pasha was Albanian born and sympathized with the Bektashi dervishes. He successfully 
liberated Mecca and Medina from Wahhabi dictatorship and latter conquered the 
Wahhabi capital, Dariyah.49 
Orthodox Sunni Muslims believe that they are the true owners of pure Islam, and 
today are represented by four authentic schools of Islamic jurisprudence. 
The Hanafi school of jurisprudence, created by Abu Hanifah, is considered the 
most tolerant of differences in opinion. It is also the most influential school of thought in 
the Muslim world. 
In the generations that followed Abu Hanifah, three other schools emerged. The 
Malikis, named after Malik Ibn Anas, center their practices in Medina. The Shafi’is, 
whose founder is Muhamad ibn-al-Shafii, based their thinking on the Hadith as well as 
the use of analogy. The Hanbalis are considered to be the pioneers of fundamentalist 
theology in Islam; the mentor, Ahmad ibn Hanbal, stressed the use of authentic Hadith in 
preference to analogy. The Shariah, or Islamic law, is the sum of all these schools of 
thought.50 
Wahhabis differentiate themselves from orthodox Sunni Muslims. They call 
themselves Salafis, meaning that they follow the Prophet’s Companions, the 
Companion’s followers, and the follower’s followers. The ideological founders of 
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Wahhabism are Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayim al- Jawziyya, who 
introduced the concepts of shirk (polytheism), kufr (unbelief in God), ridda (apostasy), 
and bida’ (innovations). 
Wahhabis perceive Sunni Muslims to have been living for centuries in the state of 
jahiliyya (ignorance) because they moved from the way of al-salaf. Wahhabis even 
accused Muslims living under the Ottoman caliphate of kufr (unbelief) because they have 
been living under political systems not known to al-salaf. Wahhabis also differentiate 
themselves from other salafis by their unorthodox understanding of assigning human 
attributes to Allah. As a result, all Wahhabis are considered to be salafists, but not all 
salafists are Wahhabis. Moreover, Wahhabis have labeled all Shia as rafida (rejectionists) 
because of their lack of faith. Thus, the most prominent feature of Wahhabism has been 
takfir (excommunication). 
Wahhabism started as a theological reform movement of revolutionary jihad. This 
movement’s goal was to urge (da’wa) people to restore the tawhid (ones of God, or 
monotheism) and disregard other practices. However, in 1929 Wahhabism was forcefully 
changed to a conservative religious movement whose goal was to uphold the loyalty of 
the royal Saudi family. 
The recent spread of Wahhabism was enabled by Ibn Baz. As a Saudi mufti and 
government scholar, he was in position to lead and develop policies for spreading 
Wahhabi believes. Under his leadership, the majority of Saudi clergy remained loyal to 
the royal family and its policies, despite considering democracy to be in contrast to their 
religion and monotheism. However, opposition movements, unsatisfied with the policies 
of the royal family, started seeking to overthrow the regime in Saudi Arabia, and 
submitted a memo demanding a system reformation. Most of their opposition was 
arrested, but Muhammad al-Mas’ari found refuge in London and established a Salafist 
organization. Later, the group split in three different wings, one of which belonged to 
Osama Bin Laden.51 
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3. Salafism 
The basic concept of Salafism is al-salaf al-salih (the pious predecessors) which 
aims to explain the true interpretations and practices of Islam, or to reject the theologies 
of Islamic schools of jurisprudence. Adherents of Salafism advocate that Muslims return 
to bases of pure Islam and practice their faith as it was intended by the prophet and his 
followers. Salafists abandon and criticize any form of polytheism (shirk), innovations 
(bid’a), and superstition (khurafa). According to salafists, all problems and conflicts in 
the world have resulted from a failure to follow religious beliefs and practices purely.52 
Following the doctrine of al-wala’ wa al-bara,’ Salafists choose to live in small, 
tight-knit, isolated communities in order to avoid any corrupting innovations from the 
world of infidels. Jews and Christians are considered a threat to Islam. In order to 
visually distinguish themselves as Muslims, Salafists wear specific clothing and grow 
long beards.53 
Unlike Wahhabis, Salafists are by nature apolitical. Following tawhid (oneness of 
God), they reject Islamic schools of jurisprudence, ijma’ (consensus), qiyas (analogical 
deduction), and independent legal reasoning. Unlike Islamists, Salafists seek to eliminate 
the political meaning of tawhid and instead focus on religious missionary work. They 
also do not acknowledge the doctrine of bay’a (oath of alliance) and do not promise 
loyalty to any leader. 
Thus, salafists argue that party politics are a manifestation of polytheism. They 
strongly reject any politics. Salafists also reject the reestablishment of caliphate because 
it is political and would cause conflict among Muslims.54 At the same time, Salafists’ 
involvement in politics is advocate of the strict application of al-sharia law. According to 
Salafists, the sharia is the only law to which Muslims should submit. Thus, unlike 
Islamist, they reject democracy, and any other ideology. 
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Salafists view the jihad specifically. Unlike radical Islamists, who wage jihad 
against Muslim rulers, Salafists jihad is a defensive war against non-Muslims. According 
to Salafists, in order to wage jihad, Muslims need the approval of a legitimate imam. In 
this sense, Salafists’ view of jihad is collective and defensive. However, Salafists argue 
that jihad can be waged without approval if the ruler has strayed from the path of pure 
Islam. Thus, although salafism is apolitical in nature it provides a base for political jihadi 
action when the concept of tawhid is violated. Finally, Salafists feel under constant threat 
from external enemies, particularly Jews and Christians.55 
Unlike Islamists, who argue that submission to shari’a law requires establishment 
of an Islamic state, Salafists believe the Islamic state is unnecessary. However, Salafists 
condone jihad as an Islamic effort to build an ideal society free from Western influence 
and control. In consequence, many Salafists have become part of radical Islam, and many 
neo-salafist radical groups have been formed. The main doctrine of these neo-salafist 
jihadist groups is the rejection of Western democracy and man-made laws (in favor of the 
shari’a law).56 
D. MUSLIMS AND THE VIOLENCE IN THE BALKANS  
The Balkans, particularly the region of “Yugoslavia,” is one of the most 
ethnically, linguistic, and religiously complex regions in the world. Two opposed schools 
of thought have been developed by scholars to explain this region’s historical role. The 
first perspective regards the region as center of competition between civilizations, while 
the second regards it as transit area between different cultures. 
Islam was introduced to the Balkans by the Ottomans, who ruled the region for 
five centuries. Different religions coexisted because Muslims regarded others with 
tolerance. Demoted as Demis or “protected residents,” non-Muslim entities were 
obligated to pay taxes to Ottomans. To avoid taxes, many converted to Islam and were 
assimilated into the Ottoman system. 
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In order for Ottomans to fulfill the needs of their military and security, they 
deported the local population and settled their own people. The Ottomans were convinced 
that the minorities would not rebel if they were surrounded by a Muslim population. 
After the First Balkan War, Ottomans were defeated and banished from the Balkans.57 
It should be noted that during World War II, the confrontation between Muslims 
in the Balkans and their adversaries created an opportunity for the infiltration of radical 
Islamic influence. Thanks to Hajj Amin al Husseini, the Mufty of Jerusalem who 
collaborated with the Nazis during the war, Muslims in the Balkans were recruited to 
fight on the side of German SS Divisions. The first Muslim division to be established in 
Bosnia, known as SS Division No.13, was called “Handzar” meaning a spear or a dagger. 
Later, the Waffen-SS 21st Division was formed form the “Muslim Albanian nucleus” and 
named Skender-beg. Finally, in mid-1944, the Waffen-23rd Division named “Kama” was 
formed.58 
The Balkans became a major attraction for Islamic militancy after Yugoslavia 
dissolved, creating an outbreak of ethnic conflicts. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, foreign 
jihadis were organized into the El Mujahid division, which was attached to the Bosnian 
army. In Albania, terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda, the Algerian Islamic Salvation 
Front (FIS), the Islamic Armed Group (GIA), and Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) infiltrated 
the country and used charities to raise and distribute funds. In relation to the war in 
Kosovo, a conference of Islamic organizations resolved to regard the Muslim Albanians 
strugles for independence as a Jihad. According to various sources, during the conflict in 
Macedonia, the ranks of the National Liberation Army (NLA) included approximately 
150 Mujahidin from Albania, Bosnia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan, all of 
whom participated in the fighting.59 
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IV. SPREAD OF ISLAMIC EXTREMISM IN MACEDONIA 
A. WAHHABISM/SALAFISM 
According to Schwartz, after the early Wahhabi movements were developed 
Arabia was conquest by the Wahhabi-Saudi, and later permanent jihad was developed in 
Afghanistan. For Wahhabi clerics, it was time to assist bin Laden, and extend the Wahabi 
“jihad” abroad. “Since then, every country where Muslims are found has witnessed a 
sharpening struggle between Wahhabis and traditionalists.”60 
The Wahhabi conquest of Balkan Islam is very complicated. An Islamic religious 
community has been present in the region since the time of Ottoman Empire, unlike other 
parts of Europe. The involvement of Saudi Arabia and Gulf states in the Balkans begin in 
the 1990s, when the dissolution of Yugoslavia was inevitable and wars broke out in 
Bosnia and Kosovo. During these wars, mujahedin actively participated, but the Wahhabi 
largely influenced Balkans, even once fighting had ended. 
The media and international experts have primarily paid attention to the rise of 
Islamic extremism in the Macedonian’s capital. Most Muslim ethnicity in this area is 
Albanian. Disputes between Albanians have been more volatile than in other parts of the 
country. The long standing dispute within IVZ is caused by the penetration of foreign-
funded Wahhabis who are challenging the legitimate leadership of IVZ for political and 
economic gain. They have gained control of several mosques in the capital. 
In September 2010, the head of IVZ, Reis-ul-Ulema Hadzi Sulejman Efendi 
Rexhepi, publicly requested help from authorities of political Albanians political parties 
and the international community in dealing with radical groups the Wahhabis and called 
for measures to stop the spread of radical Islam in the Macedonia.61 
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However, police sources and local Muslims in Macedonia attest that problems 
date back to the mid-1990s. At that time, according to Deliso, Saudi Arabia and other 
foreign sponsors exploited internal divisions within the IVZ. Representatives of the 
Islamic community were regarded as old-fashioned, Communist-trained clerics who were 
more interested in bureaucracy and ownership than in religion. In addition, radicals took 
roots in the country by exploiting the weaknesses of the recently independent 
Macedonian state.62 
These assertions were confirmed by international terrorist experts. According to 
Claude Monique, al Qaeda-inspired/related fundamentalist cells, present in the capital of 
Macedonia, were preaching an extreme form of Saudi- inspired Wahhabi Islam. Monique 
claimed that the mufti Zenun Berisha maintained close ties with al Qaeda affiliates and 
shared goals of establishing terror camps and cells. These fundamentalist cells created 
fear among local Muslims who witnessed violence directed against members of the 
Islamic community.63 
1. Intolerance toward “Other” Muslims 
One of the widespread impacts of Wahhabi presence is the rejections of tolerance 
among Muslims, including the refusal to recognize the traditions of Sufis and Shi’as. The 
Bektashi Sufi order, present in Macedonia, was a major variant that emerged after the 
collapse of Yasawi’s order in the 12th century. This order gained great influence under 
the Ottomans. Their mentor is Hajji Bektash Wali, a Turkish poet born in Iran. One of the 
famous Bektashi complexes, dating back to the 18th century, known as Harabati Tekke is 
located in Tetovo, Macedonia. Several incidents relating to the Bektasi order have 
occured in Macedonia. 
In April 2006, unknown offenders entered the yard of Harabati Tekke in Tetovo 
and ripped down the picture of Bektasi leader, Haji Bektashi Dede Reshad Bard. The 
image of his head was torn out of the picture. The leader of Tetovo Bektashi community, 
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Baba Edmond Brahimai, claimed that there are no existing disputes between his 
community and representatives of IVZ in Macedonia.64 
However, in December 2010, fire broke in the Harabati Tekke, 30 square meters 
of carving on the 300 years old ceiling were burned, and the leader of Bekatshi 
community changed his rhetoric. He claimed that the fire was created by the “other side,” 
referring to members of IVZ. According to Haji Baba Edmond Brahimai, while they were 
using the object since 1993, there were refused attempts at bribery with facilities, houses 
and cars. In addition, he claimed that in 2002, members of IVZ entered the complex and 
usurped it.65 
Those incidents were not merely executed by regular members of IVZ; they were 
acts of local Wahhabi adherents. Indeed, according to Stephen Schwartz, in 2002, a group 
of local Wahhabis (including some from Arab countries), forcefully threatened the use of 
weapons and took over the Hrabati Tekke, which is the most known religious object in 
Tetovo. They took over the guest house and dubbed it a mosque, covered the windows of 
the central building with black paper, and cut down several ancient trees. According to 
Schwartz, this confrontation was initiated from diametrically different interpretations and 
practices of Islam.66 In addition, the Center for Islamic Pluralism views these actions as 
the open aggression of Wahhabi Islamists: a serious terrorist threat to the entire region, 
and an offensive act of cultural and religious vandalism. 
Expressing concerns the Center has sent this e-mail to the U.S. Embassy and the 
President of the Republic of Macedonia: “We strenuously protest the Wahhabi invasion 
of the Harabati Tekke in Tetovo and call on the U.S. diplomatic authorities in Skopje, 
who monitor terrorist threats in the Balkans, to pressure the Macedonian government for 
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the immediate removal of the Wahhabis from the Harabati Tekke, by legal force if 
necessary, and protect the tekke from further interference.”67 
Another characteristic is a refusal to recognize Sufi and Shi’a orders, which 
excludes them from discussions. In 2006, the IVZ boycotted the New Year’s reception, 
traditionally organized by the Commission for Relations with Religious Communities, in 
the name of the Prime Minister. The head of IVZ was revolted by the presence of the 
representative of Bektashi religious community, Dervish Abdulmutalin Beqiri. According 
to the secretary of IVZ, Afrim Tahiri, the IVZ does not recognize the uniqueness of 
Bektasi community and believe they unlawfully occupied the property of IVZ in 
Tetovo.68 However, in 2010, the IVZ signed an agreement and recognized the Bektashi 
order in the city of Kicevo. It appears that the disputes between the IVZ and the Bektashi 
order in Tetovo are motivated by the claims of property. 
2. Conflict in 2001 
During the conflict in Macedonia, the presence of mujahidin groups was 
registered in all regions affected with the crisis. 
According to sources of the Ministry of Interior, in the period of 2001–2002 
around five hundred mujahidin, independently or within Albanian National Army (ANA) 
terrorist group, were participating in the fights. In the region of Kumanovo, members of 
the “Imran Elezi” mujahidin unit, with around one hundred fighters, were stationed in the 
villages of Slupcane, Matejce, Vaksince, Otlja and Lipkovo.  In the region of Skopje, 
mujahidin fighters were taking part in the armed conflicts of villages of Tanushevci, 
Brest, Malino maalo, and Arachinovo. The mujahidin group was also stationed in the 
Skopje suburb of Gazi Baba in August 2001, where five members of the terrorist group 
were executed with their leader “Teli,” who was not a Macedonian citizen, and another 
five were arrested by the Macedonian police unites. Finally in the region of Tetovo, 
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mujahedin groups were stationed in villages of Bozovce, Vejce, Gajre and Poroj. 
According to some additional information, in February 2001, two wings of the mujahedin 
organization were formed in Macedonia. The military wing was commanded by 
Muhamed Hadafan Gamili and the political wing was led by Sheik Ahmed Ali Sedan.69 
Moreover, after the signing of the Ohrid Agreement, several groups of ANA were 
still present in Macedonia. Although the existence of the organization was denied and 
negated by politicians and analysts in October 2001, around one hundred mujahidin were 
stationed in the village of Lipkovo: forty in the village of Otlja, and around thirty in 
Matejce. Around fifty mujahedin were stationed, among them from Arab countries, in 
Tetovo village of Orashje. In January 2002, a group of around twenty mujahedin entered 
the country from Kosovo and it was stationed in the village of Bogovinje. 
The presence of active fundamentalists in Macedonia brought the attention of 
experts on terrorism and raised concerns of wider international community. The reaction 
came in 2004 when French terrorism experts of the European Strategic Intelligence and 
Security Center revealed that up to one hundred fundamentalists linked to terrorist 
organizations were operating in Macedonia. In addition, Monique claimed that al-Qaeda 
had financial links with local crime and accused Zenun Berisha, the chief mufti at that 
time, of supporting radical Islam and appointing fundamentalists to positions in mosques 
and the administration of the Islamic Community of Macedonia (IVZ).70 
3. Public Protest 
Beside incidents occurring in IVZ mosques and offices, adherents to the Wahhabi 
movement did not hesitate to be active in public. In 2006 street demonstrations were 
organized in Skopje and Tetovo as an expression condemning the publishing of cartoons 
depicting the Prophet Muhammad. It was the first symbolic promotion of their presence 
in the public. 
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According to newspapers in Macedonia, protests in Skopje begin after the Friday 
prayer in front of the Yaya Pasha mosque. Later, the crowd numbered 1,000 people. 
While walking on the streets, they chanted “Allah is great,” wore black headscarves and 
waved black and green flags with Arabic inscriptions. Protests were aimed at the Danish 
consulate and the newspapers “Vreme” and “Vest.” In Tetovo, a crowd of 800 gathered 
in front of the Painted mosque. Most of these protestors were young students.”71 
The two main political parties, DPA and DUI, distanced themselves from the 
protest, but took the opportunity to accuse each other organizing the protest. According to 
Menduh Taci, the leader of DPA, the protests were organized by Zenun Berisha. Political 
analyst Mersel Bijali also said that these demonstrations were a “manipulation of children 
by certain structures who are not satisfied by the elections in IVZ.”72 Representatives of 
IVZ also condemned the publications of the cartoons, but called Muslims to walk away 
from provocation. 
Although no one officially claimed to be the organizer of the protests, because 
they took place in Skopje and Tetovo, they were an expression of Albanian Muslims. 
Other Muslim representatives in Macedonia did not participate in the protests. The 
gathering of protesters began in front of a mosque under control of the Wahhabi wing, 
possible involvement from the Wahhabi movement was presumed. Finally, most of the 
protestors were Albanian Muslims youth, indicating that indeed they were chosen 
because they were easily manipulated. Islamic extremists prefer to target schools and 
colleges because young peoples’ curiosity makes them susceptible to extremist 
arguments, and they are also a less demanding audience. 
4. Palestinian Question 
In the past, Muslims in Macedonia have mainly been indifferent toward the 
Palestine-Israel issue. However, in recent years, they began expressing their 
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dissatisfaction with the situation. In January 2009, several NGOs held a press conference 
and presented their common position regarding the violence in Gaza. They asked the 
international community to stop the violence committed toward Palestinians.73 In 
addition, in June 2010, the Israeli Navy seized a humanitarian convoy of ships heading to 
Gaza, revealing three Macedonian citizens among the humanitarian workers. A Turkish 
Islamic charity Izeta Shahin, which denied connections with Hamas or any other radical 
group, organized the convoy. Upon their arrival at the airport, Sami Emin, Yasmin 
Rechepi, and Sead Hasipi were welcomed as heroes by large crowd waving Palestinian, 
Turkish and Albanian flags.74 These were the first visible expressions of sympathy 
towards Palestinians, and negative stance toward Israel. 
5. Armed Groups 
Although neither transnational nor indigenous terrorist organizations exist in 
Macedonia, there are armed groups and individuals. In recent years, several armed 
incidents raised suspicions of the links between former members of NLA and individuals 
affiliated with alienated Islamic extremists. 
In 2007, when special police units raided Brodec in the North-West part of the 
country, it was discovered that the armed group of local Albanians was prepared for a 
long, armed struggle. Along with a vast quantity of ammunition and weapons (including 
mortars, machine guns, rifles and snipers), the police found pamphlets, documents and 
other mujahedeen propaganda material.75 
In January 2008, one police officer was killed, and two policemen were wounded 
during an armed attack by a car moving alongside the police vehicle. An investigation 
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revealed that the attack was committed by three people who had been members of NLA 
in 2001: a president of a political party, a former MP, and a policeman.76 A similar 
incident occurred in November 2008, when another police officer was killed and two 
others were wounded. According to information in the media, revenge was a possible 
motive.77 
Although these armed incidents were local, some militant Islamic extremists 
present in the country were ready to participate in global jihad. In April 2010, a local 
newspaper, citing information from “World Net Daily” and the G-2 independent research 
agency, published an article informing that Saudi Arabia princesses were pouring 
millions of British pounds into Islamist organizations in the Balkans, including 
Macedonia, in order to spread hatred towards the West and recruit fighters for jihad.78 
This information was confirmed later from other sources. According to a local 
newspaper, in November 2010, around fifty volunteers preparing to participate in the war 
in Afghanistan were being supervised by security agencies in Macedonia.79 
6. Top-Down Approach of Islamic Extremists 
As elsewhere in the Balkans, the presence of Wahhabi groups was followed by an 
internal struggle for control of religion and property owned by IVZ. In Macedonia, this 
was most obvious during 2004–2006, when struggles for power within the Islamic 
community raised the public concerns about violent infiltrations by Islamic extremists. 
Disputes started in 2004 when a group of muftis accused the head of IVZ, Arif 
Emini, of approving the fraudulent election of Zenun Berisha for Skopje mufti. The 
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drama continued in 2005 when supporters of Zenun Berisha kidnapped and beat five 
imams in the village of Kondovo. In an interview, one of the kidnapped imams, Shaban 
Ahmeti, said: 
The people who attacked us on Saturday night, are definitely 
representatives of radical Islam, or as we call them Wahhabis, who don’t 
choose any means or ways in achieving their goals. They are ready to use 
physical force, to intimidate with the use of weapons, and even kill, only 
to fulfill their plans. Shukri Aliu and Metin who were part of the group 
that attacked us, repeatedly interrupted the cabinet of the head of IVZ with 
Kalashnikovs, and did the same when violently, with shootings, stopped 
the work of the Assembly of the Islamic Community in Kondovo.80 
According to the representatives of IVZ, the leader of the kidnappers, Shukri 
Aliu, is a self-professed imam who studied in an Arab country, but no one knew exactly 
what he studied of where in Arabia he did so. Aliu was allegedly arrested in his attempt 
to enter the country with a great quantity of dynamite.81 
7. The “Mosque War” 
The conflict between Wahhabis and traditional Muslims in Macedonia became a 
“mosque war.”  The tipping point of the struggle between Wahhabis and the IZV was an 
incident at the Isa Beg mosque, in September 2010. During the Friday prayer, a mufti 
named Ibrahim Shabani, the secretary of IVZ Afrim Tahiri, and the spokesman Skender 
Buzaku were forcefully expelled from the mosque by a group of people led by Ramadan 
Ramadani, suspended imam. It was the first direct confrontation between Muslim 
believers.82 After this incident, it was publicly announced that several mosques were not 
under the control of IVZ. Many well-known mosques in the Skopje capital, such as 
Yahya Pasha, Sultan Murat, Hatundzik, and Aladja were under control of radical Islam. 
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According to representatives of IVZ, Ramadan Ramadani was involved in violent 
struggles for power in the offices of the Islamic community. Later, he was suspended as a 
lecturer for the Isa Bay mosque when it was discovered that he had only attended 
secondary theological school.83 In addition, Ramadan Ramadani was arrested in Kosovo 
by U.S. forces in 2005.84 
8. NGOs 
Islamic extremists exploit democratic societies. They are willing to take 
advantage of all the benefits offered in democracies for their advantage and their cause. 
This is also the case in Macedonia. 
Recently, it was revealed that NGOs were involved in unlawful financial 
activities. According to the representatives of IVZ, during an Islamic religious holiday in 
August 2011, some NGOs were collecting donations in the name of humanity. The names 
of NGOs involved are unknown. However, The IVZ warned them by sending a letter 
explaining that by law, collecting zakat (almsgiving or charitable giving) is the sole 
responsibility of the IVZ. In order to solve the problem, the IVZ expressed readiness to 
press charges against NGOs and seek justice in court. It remains unknown how much 
money was collected and how it was spent.85 
a. Kalaya Shkup 
In September 2010, unregistered NGO “Kalaya Shkup” invited Shefket 
Krasniqi, a controversial imam from Pristina, Kosovo, to hold a religious lecture in 
celebration of the month of Ramadan.  The event was organized by the Municipality of 
Chair, but neither the IVZ nor the Commission of Religious Communities issued a permit 
for religious lecture or public religious teaching. According to IVZ, Haji Jakup 
                                                 
83 “Вахабитите се множат во џамиите,” (Wahhabis are Multiplying in Mosques), Utrinski Vesnik, 3 August 
2010, Interview with Ibrahim Shabani mufti 
http://www.utrinski.com.mk/?ItemID=5D52BCDAE37D7F41819A43711502881C (accessed October 12, 2011). 
84 Deloso, the Coming Balkan Caliphate, 83. 
85 “Невладини организации се омрсиле во постот,” (NGOs misusing the fast),Kanal 5 Televizija, News, 
Macedonia, 30 August 2011, http://www.kanal5.com.mk/default.aspx?mId=37&egId=13&eventId=79524 (accessed 
September 30, 2011). 
 43 
Selimovski, the number of new NGOs has increased during the last few years; dealing 
with religious activities is disguised as humanitarian assistence. The identities and 
headquarters of “Kalaya Shkup” activists are unknown. Sefket Krasniqi sparked a 
controversy when he publicly stated that Mother Teresa, a native from Skopje area, 
“belongs in the middle of Hell because she did not believe in Allah, the prophet and the 
Qur’an ... Even if she believed in God her belief was incomplete, with deficiencies. God 
does not accept such worship.” According to German news agencies, Krasniqi is radical 
follower of Wahhabi ideology. Not surprisingly, some Macedonian Muslims, adherents 
to the wing of Ramadan Ramadani, consider him to be famous theology professor who 
lectures on Islam.86 
b. Muslim Youth Forum (MYF)--Forumi Rinor Islam 
The Muslim Youth Forum (MYF) was formed in Skopje in 2000. Its 
leader is Sherifi Rufat. Branches are present in Kumanovo, Tetovo, Kicevo, Struga, 
Prilep, and Gostivar. The mission of MYF is “Promotion and cultivation of Islamic and 
universal human values, protection of young people from deviations and raising and 
training them.”87 Although the activities of this organization generally remain in the 
domain of political Islam, it recently attracted greater public attention. The presence of 
Hani Ramadan, as guest speaker at a conference organized by MYF in Tetovo in August 
2011, raised concerns of Islamic radicalism. Tariq Ramadan, a well-known Islamic 
scholar and Hani Ramadan’s brother, displeased the European public with a statement 
suggesting adulterers should be stoned. Moreover, the Ramadan brothers have been 
pursued by the Swiss authorities for their radical religious ideas.88 Additional concerns 
were expressed by representatives of the IZV, who believe that the involvement of NGOs 
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in organizing religious lectures, meetings, and fundraising activities represents an 
obvious interference in religious affairs, which is the responsibility of IVZ.89 
c. Active Islamic Youth (AIO) 
The Active Islamic Youth was created after the war in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The creators are local Muslims who fought together with foreign Islamic 
fighters in the El-Mujahid unit. The main goal of this organization is to promote 
fundamentalist Islamic teachings and awaken religious sentiments among local Muslims. 
After September 11, 2001, it was revealed that AIO was funded by the Al Haramain 
Foundation and associated with al- Qaeda. Although the funds of AIO were frozen in 
2002, its members are still active.90 
Members and affiliates of the Active Islamic Youth are present in other 
parts of the Balkans such as Skopje, Tetovo, Gostivar, Struga, and Kumanovo. Although 
its membership is well established in both of the universities in Tetovo, their activities are 
mainly focused in Skopje and Kumanovo’s Brest, Lojane and Slupcane villages.91 
According to recent information, members of AIO in Macedonia coordinated the transfer 
of a considerable amount of money to Kosovo. In addition, members of AIO maintained 
close links with members of Islamic Jihad Union (IJU).92 
Other Islamic radical movements, groups, and NGOs include “Student 
Club,” whose president is Kurtishi Fatmir from the village of Arachinovo, and “El-
Mujahedeen” formed in 2006 in the village Batinci, by Samilj Demirovic. 
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d. “Wake Up”—”Razbudi se” 
The “Wake Up” NGO was established in Skopje, in 2006. Its leader is 
Artan Grubi, a former translator for the Hague Tribunal who was later an advisor in the 
Holland embassy in Macedonia. The organization’s mission is the promotion of 
education. According to some analysts, the purpose of this non-profit organization is to 
examine the conditions necessary to establish a new political party. However, “Wake Up” 
organized a public protest against archeological exploration of the “Kale” citadel in 2007, 
suggesting that Albanian archeologists should participate in the event in order to prevent 
Macedonian archeologists from destroying the roots of the citadel.93 Members of this 
organization, dissatisfied with the construction of a church–museum at the fortress, 
injured two police officers and six others in February 2011. Although this incident was 
not a religious issue, it raised concerns of inflaming religious intolerance between 
Macedonians and Albanians. 
9. Charities 
Islamic charities and relief offices arrived in the Balkans, along with the conflicts 
in Bosnia and Kosovo, and were welcomed due to their benevolent causes. However, it 
was discovered that many of these organizations and charities funded the spread of 
Wahhabi theology and terrorism. The Balkans were used as a logistical base and 
recruiting ground.94 Recently, Islamic charities have been investigated for their alleged 
Islamic extremism and money laundering. Large amounts of money, mainly from Saudi 
Arabia, have been transferred to Macedonia for the construction of a myriad of mosques, 
which are used to recruit jihad volunteers and spread Wahhabi ideology, hatred of the 
West.95 
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Authorities in Macedonia have been suspicious of Islamic charities since 1990. 
According to some sources, numerous Tirana-based Islamic charities were seeking 
permission to set up shop in Macedonia in 1996. However, charities like the IIRO and the 
Saudi High Commission were not welcomed by security and intelligence officials. The 
true goals of these charities were known to the Macedonian intelligence agencies, which 
continually created obstacles to prevent those charities from completing their registration. 
Realizing that their registration would not be allowed, charities returned to Tirana and 
later made inroads through funding the IVZ leaders in Tetovo and the madrassah in 
Kondovo.96 Moreover, Islamic charities were able to spread their activities in Macedonia. 
a. International Humanitarian Islamic Organization (IIRO) 
The international Islamic Relief Organization of Saudi Arabia (al-Ighata 
al-Islamiya al-’alamiya) is a Wahhabi organization created in 1978 as a relief department 
of the Muslim World League. After a decree was issued by the royal family of Saudi 
Arabia in 1979, IIRO opened its offices abroad. 
In early 1990, IIRO established offices in the Balkans. Under the name of 
“Igasa” (a local pronunciation of al-Ighatha), the IIRO funds an Islamic Council of 
Eastern Europe, which was chaired by the leader of the Yugoslavian Muslim community, 
Jakup Selimoski. Intending to defend the rights of Muslim minorities in Yugoslavia, the 
secretary-general of the Council, a Sudanese activist of National Islamic Front named 
Fatih al-Hassanain, founded the TWRA (Third World Relief Agency) in Vienna. 
Between 1992 and 1995, IIRO and other Islamic NGOs supplied $350 million worth of 
arms and mercenaries. Consequently, in March 1995, the government of Macedonia 
closed the Skopje IIRO office and expelled its members from the country.97 During the 
Kosovo crisis in 1999, around three thousand refugees from Kosovo were accommodated 
in Macedonia. IIRO actively supported Kosovo refugees during the Kosovo crisis (1999–
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2000). The IIRO collected and provided around $2 million for the people of Kosovo.98 It 
is unknown how much of these funds were diverged to Macedonia, and for what 
purposes. In 2003, it was confirmed that IIRO actively supported the worldwide activities 
of al-Qaeda.99 However, IIRO reopened its office in Tetovo, north-west Macedonia. 
b. Al Haramain Islamic Foundation (AHF) 
The al Haramain Islamic Foundation, also known as Mu’assasat Al-
Haramain al-Khayriyya (Charitable Establishment of the two Holy Mosques), is based in 
Jedda. It is considered one of Saudi Arabia’s most active charities working to spread 
Islamic fundamentalism. Al Haramain funded Wahhabi missionaries and built Wahhabi 
mosques all around the Balkans.100 Additionally, al Haramain funded the mujahidin unit 
in Zenica; while in Macedonia this charity office raised funds through trafficking 
narcotics and prostitutes.101 Al Haramain was also involved in the Kosovo crisis. 
Representatives of this charity organization, while alleging to support the refugees in 
Macedonia, persuaded UNMIK to sign a memorandum of understanding in 2002.102 In 
2008, the U.S. Department of the Treasury designated AHF and its international branches 
to support al-Qaeda and its wide range of terrorist organizations. However, despite the 
efforts of the international community, AHF leaders have reconciled their operations.103 
                                                 
98 1999, News Story, “Saudi Arabia assesses its aid to Kosovar refugees,” The Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, 
Washington, DC, Archives, June 4, 1999, http://www.saudiembassy.net/archive/1999/news/page230.aspx (accessed 
October 10, 2011).  
99 Public Hearing, National Commission on terrorist Attacks upon the United States, July 9, 2003, Archives, 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/hearings/hearing3.htm (accessed October 14, 2011). 
100 Victor Comras,”Al Qaeda Finances and Funding to Affiliated Groups,” Center for Contemporary Conflict, 
Strategic insights, Volume IV, Issue 1 (January 2005), 
http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2005/Jan/comrasJan05.pdf (accessed October 
10, 2011). 
101 Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 
133. 
102 Tom Burghardt, “Telecom Immunity: Playing the “9/11 Card”…Again,” Center for research on Globalization, 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=8486 (accessed October 10, 2011). 
103 U.S. Department of Treasury, Press Center, “Treasury Designates Al Haramain Islamic foundation,” June 19, 
2008, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1043.aspx (accessed October 14, 2011). 
 48 
c. Bamiresia 
Bamiresia is a Macedonian based Islamic charity headed by Bekir Halimi, 
an ethnic Albanian imam trained in Syria. It was established in 1997 in Skopje and later 
became active in almost all major cities inhabited by Muslims, including Tetovo, Struga, 
Debar, Kicevo, Gostivar, and Kumanovo. 
In recent years, the Bamiresia charity has been under investigation for 
terrorist links and money laundering, but the police have failed to provide sufficient 
evidence. In an interview with a journalist from The Sunday Times, Halimi refused to 
name the sources of funding, and rejected any links to criminal activity. He also 
expressed his opinion that his organization is entitled to funds from Saudi Arabia.104 
However, recent information confirms suspicious activities of Bemiresia, 
which concerned Macedonian security officials and diplomats. During 2006, this 
organization was heavily involved in money laundering. The main sources of Besimirea’s 
funding are al-Waqf al-Islamia NGO from Saudi Arabia, and Revival of Islamic Heritage 
Society (RIHS) based in Kuwait. 
In order to avoid exposure, Halimi was advised to register his organization 
as an official branch of the International Humanitarian Islamic Organization in 
Macedonia, or to rename and reorganize the organization.105 Both RIHS’s and al-Waqf 
al-Islamia’s offices in some Balkan countries were penetrated by extremist members of 
Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and al-Qaeda.106 
10. The Internet and Promotion of Islamic extremism and Jihad 
Globalization and technological innovations has led to international connectivity 
and interdependence. Today, the Internet is one of the most common and efficient 
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methods of sharing information. Islamic extremists have also used this to reach a global 
audience. In Macedonia, the Internet was used to promote jihad and radical Islamic 
ideology. 
a. DVDs and Literature 
Ten years ago, it was shocking news to find that DVDs of Chechen jihad 
secretly circulated in some mosques. In recent years, however, it is not unusual to find 
similar DVDs, depicting mujahidin killing Americans, sold freely in Skopje and Tetovo 
markets and mosque bookstores. According to Deliso, although Islamic extremists are 
comfortable distributing propaganda, they are cautious and operate patiently. 
While interviewing a young Albanian in Skopje, Deliso discovered that 
local Islamic charities offer good paying jobs making daily trips to Kosovo to pick up 
DVDs and CDs. According to Deliso’s witness DVDs were imported discreetly in order 
to avoid suspitions from border officials. Deliso observed that it is common to see 
bearded Wahhabis offering Saudi literature on the main shopping street of Struga, a 
tourist town on Lake Ohrid.107 
b. Video 
There are many songs posted on the Internet about Bin Laden and al-
Qaeda, often in Arabic language. However, in August 2010 an online music video 
devoted to Osama bin Laden was registered and aired for the first time, in Albanian 
language, on an Islamic forum. The short video shows a group of men celebrating al-
Qaeda’s war against the West, they sing “Oh Osama, annihilate the American army. Oh 
Osama, raise the Muslims honor. I September 2001 you conquered a power. We all pray 
for you.” The author and poster of this video are unknown. Representatives from IVZ 
were aware of the video, and expressed their belief that it was created by Wahhabi groups 
controlling several Skopje mosques.108 Irrespective of the author, the video is promotes 
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jihad and glorifies Bin Laden and al-Qaeda. The language of the video clearly identifies 
that Albanians are the intended audience; the video aims to recruit Albanian Muslims for 
the jihad. 
c. Monotheism.com—Monoteizam.com 
Monotheism.com is a website that promotes anti-Western attitude and 
anti-democratic ideologies, as well as fundamentalist Islamic teachings. Similar to other 
Islamic extremists websites, negative sentiments are expressed towards Westerners and 
particularly toward Americans. Recently, the website posted a video clip titled 
“Democracy and Taguti in 21st century” depicting American soldiers in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, amidst suffering children and women. Pictures of war atrocities are edited to 
an Arabic song, subtitled in Macedonian, in which God’s help is required in the struggle 
with the infidels (according to their perspective.) The video starts with a post of “Da’va 
Tawhid Labunista,” which refers to call for missionary work on the oneness of God in a 
village in south west part of Macedonia inhabited by Macedonian Muslims, called 
“Torbeshi.” 
The same website is filled with videos and articles critiquing democracy. 
While democracy is frequently described as a made-up faith of kafir (unbelievers) in 
which gods are creators and followers are slaves, these videos advocate the law of Allah, 
Islam, and the Qur’an. Videos depicting allegiances between Western and Muslim figures 
are critiqued for their promotion of democracy. 
One of the website’s functions is to offer Islamic teachings and literature 
advocating Islamic fundamentalist ideology. Numerous articles promote and glorify the 
teachings of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Articles, such as “Refutation of Sufi infidel 
misconceptions” and “Refutation of Shia’s infidel ideologies,” explicitly promote 
intolerance towards Sufi and Shi’a traditions. The website calls for denial, hatred, 
hostility and excommunication against the “unfaithful,” even when the unfaithful are 
fathers, sons, brothers, and relatives. Several hundred members participate in the site’s 
online forum. 
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The site is hosted in England, but the founders, moderators and financiers 
are unknown. However, the primary target audience is clear, due to the site’s Macedonian 
language: the “Torbeshi” population in Macedonia, who are viewed and targeted as a 
source of sympathizers, new members, and support. The website does not offer 
conceptual or ideological innovations of contemporary Islamic radical ideology. Rather, 
the content is taken from other websites, forums, and online sources of jahiliyya, shirk, 
etc. These sources are then adapted for Macedonian Muslims. This website confirms the 
cross-national characteristic of Islamic extremist ideology. 
B. TABLIGHI JAMA’AT 
In 1926, the Tablighi Jama’at (the “Society for Spreading Faith”) was founded in 
Mewat, India by Maulana Muhammad Ilyas, an Islamic scholar and teacher. The 
movement arose as a counteraction to Hindus in India attempting to convert Muslims to 
Hinduism. Islamic education was perceived to be incapable of facing the challenge, so 
Islamic missionaries were sent to Muslim villages and instill Islamic values. However, 
due to its past political pacifism, the movement was able to expand its membership 
beyond the Indian subcontinent. While most of its members still live in Pakistan, 
Bangladesh and Indonesia, the movement is present in parts of Europe, such as the UK, 
France and Spain. Theologically, most of Tablighi Jama’at scholars and leaders are 
associated with Deobandi school of Sunni Islam, which originated in South Asia. 
Although this school of Islamic law has much in common with Wahhabi style, its 
doctrine is more flexible and accepts Islamic approaches such as Sufism.109 
Although Tablighi Jama’at teaches that the reformation of societies can be 
achieved apolitically through a personal renewal of spirituality, the movement has been 
connected to worldwide terrorist activities. According to John Walker Lindh, the 
“American Taliban” existed in the mujahedin training camp because of Tablighi Jama’at 
missionaries. Richard Reid, the would-be shoe bomber, visited the Tablighi mosque 
frequently; Zacarias Moussaoui, the “20th hijacker” in the 9/11 plot was a regular 
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worshiper at the Tablighi mosque in Paris; the July 7 London bombers worshiped at the 
headquarters of Tblighi Jama’at in Dewsbury, and their leader lived close the mosque. 
Moreover, the movement through its intimate ties with high officials of Pakistan’s Inter-
Services Intelligence (ISI) provided to mujahidin in Afghanistan wherever needed during 
the 1980s anti-Soviet jihad. Tablighi Jama’at by supplying around five thousand fighters 
was closely affiliated with Harkat-ul-Mujahedeen (HUM). Later, HUM jihadis fought in 
Chechnya, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Tajikistan, Burma, Kashmir, and the Philippines.110 
Tablighi Jamaat in Macedonia was formed in 1994. Its leader is Ismail Seyfula 
from Skopje. Branches of the movement are located in Tetovo, Struga, Resen, Debar, 
Kicevo, Prilep, Gostivar, Kumanovo, Veles, and Valandovo. 
Members of Tablighi Jammat probably passed through Macedonia for the first 
time in 1997, on their way to Greece. No activity from this group was visible until 2005, 
when a group of five Pakistani nationals and British-born Pakistanis arrived at Skopje 
International Airport. Welcomed by local Islamic leaders, this group traveled to villages 
populated by the “Torbeshi.”111 The term “Torbesh” is a pejorative term refering to 
Macedonians who converted to Islam. 
Two distinguishing characteristics of Tblighi Jama’at are the lack of centralized 
control and working within the system. Administrative control over Tablighis activities 
and membership is almost impossible due to its large number of followers and part-time 
members. This means that Tablighi missionaries operate uniquely, separate from the 
methods, intentions and inclinations of local Muslim leaders. However, over the time the 
movement has shown willingness to cooperate with local political institutions and respect 
local laws.112 
The Pew Forum on Religion and public life identify the Tablighi Jama’at as 
“Small groups of missionary preachers travel together and reach out to Muslims of all 
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social strata to remind them of the core principles of Islam, encouraging them to attend 
mosque prayers and listen to sermons.”113 However, Tablighi leader was quoted saying: 
We must leave our houses, our businesses, our families, for a short period 
of time, and follow the path of Allah and practise the ways of the prophet, 
going from mosque to mosque. Then [the behaviour] will become second 
nature to us. We shall go to India and Pakistan for four months to follow 
these [Islamic] ways. 
This is very similar to what happened in Macedonia. According to residents of the 
village of Labunishta, small groups of local “Torbeshi” man spend several months in 
Pakistan and Afghanistan while their families live very comfortably at home, even when 
unemployed.114 
Secretive, isolated men with long beards, and wives veiled in black from head to 
toe have raised suspicions of funding. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab 
Emirates funded Muslim youth in Macedonia, allowing them to participate in missionary 
activities, study in foreign countries, and publish Islamic literature. When a young 
Albanian Muslim entered a university in Saudi Arabia, Wahhabis offered him an 
apartment, plus two hundred euros per month, for spreading their customs in Macedonia. 
A young journalist, and his family, investigating the Wahhabi’s funding were 
threatened.115 
The presence of secretive, foreign Islamic groups in Macedonia has attracted 
attentions from local and foreign intelligence agencies. According to Deliso, Italian, 
French and American secret services were conducting intelligence operations. It was 
discovered that in early 2005, up to one hundred local and foreign Islamists were present 
around villages in the forests of Jablanica mountain. Nationals from Saudi Arabia, 
Yemen, Jordan, Egypt and Morocco were among them. Later, it was discovered that at 
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least three “summer homes” and one physical training course were constructed in nearly 
impenetrable mountain range where young people were educated about “real” Islam.116 
According to Macedonian intelligence officials, groups of ten to twenty 
Malaysian nationals made regular visits for several years to areas populated with 
Muslims. Posing as tourists, they brought money to villagers with long beards and veiled 
women. They also offered instructions and directions. Local believers are being asked to 
follow conservative norms and customs, boycott products from the U.S. and West 
Europe, and instead promote Arab products. Arabs from France, and jihadist Pakistanis 
expelled from Britain also make frequent trips to Macedonia. Villages like Oktisi and 
Labunista are remote enough to remain active without being monitored.117 
C. GULEN MOVEMENT 
The Gulen movement emerged in the late 1960s in the city of Izmir, Turkey. The 
founder of the movement, Fethullah Gulen, argues that in modern world social and 
political reforms can be achieved by educational programs that combine modern 
scientific knowledge with extracurricular focus on conservative religious values. The 
movement built hundreds of schools around the world, primarily in Germany, to pursue 
its agenda. 
Followers of the movement call these schools as “Gulen-inspired” educational 
institutions because most of them are funded by Turkish business leaders who follow 
Gulen’s teachings. Classes are taught in the language of the host country, and do not 
include religious topics. However, teachers are, without exception, affiliated with the 
movement; activities in dormitories and community centers are overtly religious. These 
schools have a reputation providing quality education, which makes them popular even 
with secular families. 
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Members of the Gulen movement own newspapers, television stations, 
international news agencies and websites. The extent to which these media sources serve 
the movement’s goals and target Turkish diasporas, varies. This movement also promotes 
its activities through conferences, seminars, and trips abroad. Because of its distinctively 
Turkish character and commitment to assimilating Muslims into modern societies, the 
Gulen movement does not generally establish ties with other Muslim organizations. 
However, the Gulen movement does not allow access to information about its 
operations and facilities. This secrecy has raised concerns and suspicions. In addition, the 
movement’s rapid expansion has led to scrutiny.118 
According to a former student of Gulen school, in Macedonia, students 
considered to be “the brightest and most interested” participated in extracurricular lessons 
concerning radical Islam. In Struga and Gostivar schools, these activities take place after 
school hours, in small, specially selected groups. Introduced by the teacher as secret 
initiates, groups would praise fundamentalism. It is unclear whether these activities are 
part of the school’s institutional curriculum, or whether they are a local deviation. In both 
cases, these situations offer insight into how even “moderate Islam” can be used to mask 
more radical activities.119 
D. ALBANIANS 
Macedonia’s major Muslim minority are Albanians. According a 2002 census, 
they represent approximately 25 percent of the total population. They primarily live in the 
northwest parts of the country bordering Albania and Kosovo. Although Albanians in the 
region are divided between three different religions, ethnic Albanians in Macedonia are 
almost exclusively Muslim. This religious affiliation played an important role in their 
national development. Albanians have distinct language, culture and kinship. The 
Albanians in Macedonia are Gegs, who comprise the larger of two subgroups (the other is 
comprised of Tosks). Although the Geg’s tribal structure disappeared, a patriarchal 
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system is still present among Albanians in Macedonia.120 This group of Albanians is 
more socially conservative than their relatives in Albania and Kosovo; some of their 
customs date back to the time of the Ottomans. It can be concluded that Islam remains 
marginal in the narrative and actions of the Albanian national movement. 
The relationship between Macedonians and the ethnic Albanians are challenging. 
Albanians boycotted the referendum on Macedonian independence, as well as the census 
in 1991. This raised a question of loyalty, despite other Albanian participation in 
Macedonian politics, even holding positions in parliament. When an unofficial 
referendum on the creation of an autonomous sector was held in 1993, Albanians decided 
to pursue their cultural and political rights through democratic means. Tensions between 
Albanians and Macedonians increased after the establishment of the Albanian-language 
University in Tetovo. Prominent Albanians were arrested and charged with preparing a 
uprising, and removed Albanian flags from the municipality buildings in Tetovo and 
Gostivar. 
Tensions peaked in late 2000, when Albanian guerrilla forces attacked 
Macedonian police and security forces. Fights started in small villages on the Kosovo 
border and spread to Tetovo, Kumanovo and Skopje. The National Liberation Army 
(NLA, or UCK in Albanian), whose leader was Ali Ahmeti, claimed responsibility for the 
attacks. The newly formed nationalist Albanian political party, the National Democratic 
Party, joined the efforts of NLA, although it claimed that no link exists between them. 
President Boris Trajkovski initiated a dialog between all Macedonian political parties in 
order to produce a political solution. These talks were problematic, even under the 
mediation of EU and U.S. diplomats. Hostilities eventually ceased after the Ohrid 
agreement was signed in Skopje on August 13, 2001. However, a rebel group called the 
Albanian National Army (ANA) splintered form the NLA and continued attacks to fulfill 
their goal of a “greater Albania.”121 
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E. TURKS 
Turks in the Republic of Macedonia are the third largest ethnic group in the 
country. In 2002, Turks constituted approximately four percent of the total population, 
and around twelve percent of Muslims living in Macedonia. The majority of Turks live in 
the western area of Macedonia.122 It should be noted that in 1953, after the collapse of 
the Ottoman Empire, many Turks emigrated to Turkey. For Turks in Macedonia the link 
between Islam and national identity has been historically conditioned with the 
developments of political and religious activities in Turkey. In Macedonia, this 
community successfully maintains good relations with other Muslim populations and is 
integrated in state institutions. 
Represented by the Democratic Party of Turks, Turks have always participated in 
Macedonian politics. In general, the party advocates the values of a secular state and 
equality. Turks actively promote and defend Turkish language, culture, and Muslim faith 
in Macedonia. Turkey’s historical legacy, coming from the Ottoman past, also affects 
social and political life in Macedonia. Turkish governments, NGOs, charities, schools, 
and international developmental agencies have been sensitive to the legacy of the 
Ottoman legacy, and how its past is viewed. In recent years, the religiously inspired 
Gulen movement has become active in the country. In the mid-1990s a Turkish 
newspaper “Zaman” began publishing, and was later translated into Albanian language as 
well. Moreover, this movement supports private “Yahya Kemal” schools in Skopje, 
Gostivar, and Struga. Although most of the school’s attendants are Turks, these schools 
are also available for children of Muslim elites from other nationalities. 
F. MACEDONIAN MUSLIMS 
“Torbeshi” are the Macedonian Muslim minority that settled in the western part of 
the country. There are many arguments regarding why they converted to Islam. However, 
it is evident that they are culturally distinct from Orthodox Christians in Macedonia, and 
linguistically distinct from Albanians and Turks. An exact number of Macedonian 
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Muslims is unknown because, in the past, many identified themselves as Turks, and some 
have been assimilated into Albanian culture. Thus, “Torbeshi” have always sought to 
avoid trouble with their neighbors. 
Traditionally, like other rural populations in Macedonia, Torbeshi send male 
family members to work as laborers in Europe in order to subsidize their families back 
home. In recent decades, great numbers of Macedonian Muslims emigrated to Western 
Europe and North America; however they are often willing to return to their villages 
during the summer and marry local women. 
Recently, disputes regarding Macedonian Muslim identity peaked when three 
MPs declared themselves as “Torbeshi” and asked to be treated as an ethnic minority. In 
addition, they wanted the Preamble of the Constitution to be changed, and “Torbeshi” 
included as separate ethnic minority. Anger and disagreement came from the Association 
of Macedonians with Islamic religion. According to the president of the Association, 
Ismail Boida, the term “Torbesh” comes from the sequence of numbers four and five (in 
Turkish dort and besh) and refers to four or five man who converted to Islam, not to an 
ethnicity or nation. He argued that there is a distinction between religion and nation.123 
Despite recent disputes, Macedonian Muslims identify themselves first and 
foremost as Muslims. They have always lived conservatively, and even today, drinking 
alcohol, nightlife, and photographs are frowned upon. Nevertheless, the number of 
bearded Wahhabis in their villages has increased over the years. Funds from Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates are used by rich youth groups for 
missionary work, publishing Islamic literature, and studying abroad. Adherents are also 
paid to dress and act in accordance with Wahhabi tradition.124 
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Historically alienated from Macedonians and Albanians, Macedonian Muslims 
are more susceptible to outside influence. Because religion is the main source of their 
identity, they have become a primary target for Arab proselytizers seeking to make 
inroads to Macedonia. 
G. RHOMAS 
The exact number of Rhoma is very hard pinpoint because they population are 
scattered around the world, and they are often not permitted to claim their identity. 
Historically, the Rhomas in Macedonia belong to the first group that migrated toward 
Western Europe and decided to settle. According to the 2002 census, Rhomas constitute 
around 2.6 percent of the total population in the Republic of Macedonia. They exist in 
several subgroups and differentiate in their language, social status and religious 
affiliation. 
Rhomas have often been a target for assimilation because they are such a small 
group. Although most Rhomas in Macedonia speak their native language, in the Western 
part of the country they communicate in Albanian and Turkish. In the Eastern part of the 
country, a group of Rhomas declare themselves as Turks. Most Rhomas are Muslims, and 
a small number are Christians. The relationship between these two religious groups has 
often been mistrustful. Muslim Rhomas believe that Christian Rhomas are not true 
Rhomas. Recently, Rhomas coming from Germany and Belgium promote the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses religion among other Rhomas in Macedonia; this religion remains largely 
unaccepted.125 
Recently, local newspapers have brought the happenings in Shuto Orizari, a 
municipality inhabited largely by Rhomas, to the public’s attention. The decision to build 
a new mosque in the center of the municipality, which had been intended for a shopping 
mall, was followed by disputes among local residents. In March 2006, Gunesh Mustafa, 
the president of the Democratic Integration of Rhomas political party, filed charges 
against the mayor of Shuto Orizari, Erduan Iseni, and the chairmen of the municipal 
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council, Ljuam Selimi. They were accused of breaking urbanization laws, violating the 
equity of citizens, and usurping land. Additionally, according to Mustafa, there was a 
danger that the construction of the mosque would create religious and racial intolerance. 
However, Iseni was also the general secretary of the United Party of Rhoma, which was 
part of the coalition in the existing government.126 The mosque was built and there is no 
more information in regarding the filed charges. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Three theories are used to explain the conditions under which Islamic extremist 
ideologies are spread among Muslims in Macedonia, each with different levels of utility. 
The social movement theory is applicable to Macedonia and explains the dynamic 
processes of the Islamic extremist ideologies. The fundamentalism theory is also 
applicable, and leads to the conclusion that, Islamic extremist ideologies have not 
emerged in reaction to secularism in Macedonia, and thus can be categorized as potential 
fundamentalism. The cosmic war theory is not applicable to Macedonia because the level 
of violence in Macedonia is very low and does not represent a sacred struggle of Muslims 
in the country. 
Social movement theory suggests several findings. Major political, economic, and 
legal changes in Macedonia have provided a fertile ground for nontraditional Islamic 
ideologies. There is a myriad of incidents and situations that were exploited by Islamic 
extremists, including the collapse of the Yugoslav Federation, the fall of socialism as a 
political system, the religious revival, the conflict in 2001, weak institutions of the new 
independent state, and tensions among ethnic minority groups in Macedonia. Although 
adherents to radical Islamic ideologies in Macedonia have used NGOs, charities, and IVZ 
as mobilizing structures, they were not able to create their own organization. Thus their 
survival depends on the support of external factors. For most Muslims in Macedonia, 
critiques and visions of contemporary radical Islamic ideologues are problematic as 
framing processes. Findings also suggest that Muslims in Macedonia are most vulnerable 
to individual recruitment; the attempts of local Islamic extremist to mobilize a greater 
number of followers for collective action were unsuccessful. 
Fundamentalism theory suggests that activities of Wahhabi affiliates in 
Macedonia follow the pattern of fundamentalist movements. However, most ideological 
and organizational characteristics of fundamentalist movements are absent in Macedonia, 
or present only to a low degree. The findings also suggest that, in Macedonia, Islamic 
extremist ideologies are not a reaction to secularism and modernism, nor do they defend 
religion. The absence of this ideological characteristic differentiates them from 
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fundamentalism. Although their characteristics are very similar to fundamentalism, it 
would be wrong to place them in this category. Thus, activities of Wahhabi adherents in 
Macedonia can be categorized as potential or marginal fundamentalism. 
A. WHAT IS THE THREAT? 
Neither transnational nor indigenous Islamic terrorist organizations exist in 
Macedonia. However, the cause and effect analogy between Islamic extremist ideologies 
and Islamic terrorism should not be ignored. The presence of Islamic extremist ideologies 
places Macedonia in a frontline position to counter Islamic extremists. This section 
analyzes the degree to which different Islamic ideologies pose security threats to 
Macedonia. 
The ideology of Islamism advocates the shari’a law as the establishment of 
Islamic state. The most radical Islamists oppose any inclusion of Western concepts, while 
moderate Islamists accept democracy and pluralism. In both cases, these ideas inherently 
pose a threat to the country, although these threats do not seem achievable. Adherents to 
these ideas in Macedonia are represented by Turks living in the country, who have been 
greatly influenced by the Gulen movement and the political situation in Turkey. 
However, minority Turks in Macedonia have never been involved in violent incidents, 
and have appreciated religious freedom while participating in political life. 
One of the most important characteristics of Wahhabism as an ideology is takfir, 
or excommunication. Its goal is to theologically purify followers of Islam. Adherents to 
Wahhabism have accused the majority of all Sunni Muslims of jurisprudence, and all 
Shia’s of innovation and unbelief. It is obvious that Wahhabi ideas are first and foremost 
directed towards fellow Muslims and its leadership, and latter toward the rejection of 
democratic role by people. In the case of Macedonia this ideas serves well in regard to 
internal conflicts among ethnic Albanian Muslims. Their struggle for power and property 
has often been followed by violent incidents. However, the majority of Muslims in 
Macedonia prefer traditional Islam, represented by Hanafi school of jurisprudence. It 
seems that adherents to Wahhabism in Macedonia pose a threat, but their existence 
depends on foreign funding and external support. 
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The ideology of Salafism advocates the “true” interpretations and practices of 
Islam, and rejects the Islamic schools of jurisprudence. Salafists criticize all forms 
polytheism, innovations, and superstition. They are apolitical in nature, do not advocate 
establishment of an Islamic state, and live in isolated communities. For these reasons, this 
ideology might br attractive to Macedonian Muslims, for whom Islam has been major 
factor of identity. 
It should be noted that no further analysis of Islamic extremist ideologies would 
result in a clearer assessment of the threat they pose to Macedonia. It is difficult to 
distinguish between different Islamic extremist ideologies because they have blended 
together in the last several decades. The ethno-linguistic composition of Muslims in 
Macedonia is very complex, and Islamic extremist ideologies in the country became 
present only in very recent history. Finally, it seems that Macedonia does not fit well in 
the concept of near and far enemy and thus Islamic terrorist organizations will more 
likely use the country as a refuge. 
B. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE 
Although research suggests that, in Macedonia, affiliates of Islamic extremist 
ideologies can be categorized as potential or marginal fundamentalism, they still pose a 
threat. This is especially true when the worldwide concern regarding religiously 
motivated terrorism is taken into account. According to David Rapoport, the world is 
currently in the “fourth wave” of terrorism,127 and according to Cronin, this wave is 
dominated by religiously inspired groups with access to dangerous technology.128 
1. Counter the Ideology 
Most scholars agree that Islamic radical ideologies are driving force of Islamic 
terrorism. Some scholars suggest that countering radical Islamic ideologies is the best 
way to deal with the threat. In her work Fighting the Jihad of the Pen, Heather S. Gregg 
argues that the ideology of contemporary Islamic terrorist organizations is not new, and 
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their vision for a better world order is vague.129 However, the author also acknowledges 
that governments often lack credibility, and concludes the best approach for countering 
Islamic radical ideologies in the Muslim world is to nurture a culture of questioning and 
debating. This policy suits Macedonia well. Any direct government involvement will 
most likely make the situation even worse while the indirect approach might result 
positively. 
2. Fighting Organized Crime 
The notion that organized crime and terrorism are linked is not new. Phil 
Williams argues that there are three distinct relationships between organized crime and 
terrorist networks: cooperation, use of criminal methods by terrorist groups, and 
transformation of criminal activities into terrorist ones. The author believes the most 
serious threat is the transformation of criminals into terrorists.130 Fighting organized 
crime is a plausible recommendation for Macedonia. These measures would dramatically 
decrease money laundering activities, reduce terrorist threats, and strengthen overall 
stability in the country. 
3. Application of Social Science Concepts 
This section proposes application of three concepts of recent work in social 
science; social network analysis, social models and social movements, and undermining 
dark networks in order to provide better understanding and more effective 
counterterrorism actions in Macedonia. These methods would enable identification of 
such groups and movements if they pose a security threat as well as provide a method for 
alleviating the threat. 
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a. Social Network Analysis 
One policy recommendation for counterterrorism measures is the 
application of social sciences aiming to understand how groups of individuals operate and 
behave. According to Sparrow, there is a pertinent link between social network analysis 
and intelligence analysis. Such collaboration would benefit both fields.131 According to 
Stuart Koschade,132 social network analysis can assist in understanding the structure and 
communication of covert or extremist networks, and assist in predicting the outcomes of 
underground cells. In his work, Koschade presents a framework that is relatively simple, 
but based on academic principles that provide tools for intelligence analysis. 
b. Beyond Structural Analysis 
Another policy recommendation is related to the prevention and 
intervention options in dealing with extremist groups. In her work, Susie Driscoll133 
argues that the formation of extremist organizations is an organic process, and its 
different developmental phases provide different opportunities for influence. According 
to her, extremist organizations are most vulnerable in their early stages of recruitment, 
most impenetrable when the socialization is completed. The author also suggests 
strategies to influence the social formation of extremist organizations. Driscoll believes 
these groups should be organized to generate awareness within targeted communities, 
empower alternative groups, reduce isolation, challenge the myths, and fragment the 
empathy among members. 
These are great policy recommendations for Macedonia. Potential 
extremist organizations in Macedonia are in the early stages of development, which 
provides the unique opportunity for influence and prevention. 
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In his work, Brian A. Jackson uses a perspective of function, rather than 
structure, to decipher whether terrorist groups should be considered “groups,” 
“networks,” or “movements.” He argues that these labels are important when designing 
counterterrorism efforts. He categorizes terrorist “groups” where a leader exerts strategic, 
operational, and tactical control; they are “networks” when the leader controls only 
strategy and operations; and when leaders only influence strategy, they are “social 
movements,” defined as “a group of people with common ideology who try together to 
achieve certain general goals.”134 This categorization enables internal and external 
boundaries of terrorist organizations to be drowned on three levels, each of which has 
advantages and disadvantages. However, the author concludes that there is no solution for 
creating appropriate boundaries around complex terrorist groups, although awareness of 
existing advantages should not be given up. 
In Macedonia, if connections do exist, leaders of terrorist organizations 
such as al-Qaeda would exert control only at a strategic level. Findings also suggest that 
Wahhabis in Macedonia should be categorized as a social movement, which supports the 
social movement theory. This categorization is important when dealing with the spread of 
Islamic extremist ideologies in Macedonia. 
c. Undermining Dark Networks and Extremist Groups 
Intelligence is crucial to winning the war on terror. However, traditional 
intelligence-gathering techniques are inefficient. To infiltrate terrorist networks is nearly 
impossible because of the vast amount of networks that exist. It would take years for 
informants to gain trust of networks. Undercover operations also compromise the 
government informants when they are forced to participate in violent acts. All of these 
difficulties are amplified when applied to global terrorist networks. 
 
                                                 
134 Brian A. Jackson, “Groups, Networks, or Movements: A command-and-Control-Driven Approach to 
Classifying Terrorist Organizations and Its Application to Al-Qaeda,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Routledge, 29, 
no.3, April–May 2006, 248. 
 67 
Thus, techniques of gathering intelligence from outside terrorist networks 
were developed. The SNA is one method of understanding how networks operate, but 
these analyses are not sufficient for disrupting and neutralizing terrorist networks simply 
because they are structured around trust. 
Kathleen Carley explains that jealousies and distrust can be intentionally 
instilled into terrorist networks in order to slow the performance. This can be achieved by 
reducing the number of times the group can communicate, or by rapid rotation 
(capturing) of the personnel in the network. According to Frank Fukuyama, if a network 
is tightly bound and not embedded in other networks, it can be neutralized by removing 
its key leaders. 
Experts emphasize the role of new technology in disrupting terrorist 
communication. According to John Arquilla, technological innovations such as “cookie” 
softwares, “honey pots” websites, and keystroke reconstructions can expose a terrorist 
network’s structure, breed distrust, and divide members. Manuel Castells takes this 
approach even further, suggesting that by creating websites and joining networks, it is 
possible to infiltrate and then destroy terrorist trust structures. 
In their work “Strategies for Combating Dark Networks,”135 Nancy 
Roberts and Sean F. Everton advise that the use of SNA metrics, for developing counter-
terrorism strategies, should depend on context rather than being used to define and drive 
a particular strategy. The authors conclude that ability to identify key players depends on 
the strategy one pursues, not on the metrics one chooses.  
The authors recognize the value of SNA, but recommend that it should be 
embedded within a larger strategic and theoretical framework. The finding has even 
greater importance if we take in account that the proposed strategies are not mutually 
exclusive. They can be sequenced or combined in a manner to achieve greater effect. 
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